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ABSTRACT
The inertia of the local-currency prices of traded goods in the face of exchange-rate changes is a well-documented
phenomenon in International Economics. This paper develops a structural model to identify the sources
of this local-currency price stability and applies it to micro data from the beer market. The empirical
procedure exploits manufacturers’ and retailers’ first-order conditions in conjunction with detailed
information on the frequency of price adjustments following exchange-rate changes to quantify the
relative importance of local non-traded cost components, markup adjustment by manufacturers and
retailers, and nominal price rigidities in the incomplete transmission of such changes to prices. We
find that, on average, approximately 60% of the incomplete exchange rate pass-through is due to local
non-traded costs; 8% to markup adjustment; 30% to the existence of own-brand price adjustment costs,
and 1% to the indirect/strategic effect of such costs, though these results vary considerably across
individual brands according to their market shares.
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The incomplete transmission of exchange-rate shocks to the prices of imported goods has been the
focus of a substantial amount of theoretical and empirical research. In his 2002 article in the NBER
Macroeconomics Annual, Charles Engel discusses this research and identiﬁes three potential sources
for this incomplete exchange-rate pass-through: the existence of local costs (e.g., costs for non-traded
services) even among goods typically considered to be “traded”; markup adjustment by retailers and/or
manufacturers; and nominal price rigidities (at times referred to as “menu costs”) that lead to what
Engel has labelled “local-currency pricing”. Despite the signiﬁcant amount of work and interest in
this topic, evidence on the relative importance of each of these contributing factors remains mixed,
in part because some of the key variables needed to identify their role, such as markups or local
costs, are not directly observable, especially not in aggregate data. Yet, in an era characterized by
a continuing devaluation of the dollar against other major currencies, concerns about the impact of
China’s exchange-rate policy on domestic prices, and persistent uncertainty about the eﬀect of exchange
rates on the unwinding of global imbalances, it is more important than ever to understand why import
prices do not respond fully to exchange-rate changes, especially as diﬀerent explanations have very
diﬀerent implications for exchange rate policy.
Aided by the increased availability of micro data sets, a set of recent studies has focused on the
microeconomics of the cross-border transmission process, trying to identify the relative contribution of
each source of price inertia within structural models of particular industries. The advantage of these
studies is that institutional knowledge of the industry can be used to inform modeling assumptions
which, applied to detailed consumer or product-level data, can deliver credible estimates of markups
and local costs. The disadvantage is that the results are not generalizable without further work on
other markets. Still, the few studie sa v a i l a b l et od a t eh a v ei d e n t i ﬁed interesting empirical patterns
that are surprisingly robust across markets, time, and speciﬁc modeling assumptions.
The general structure of the approach in this literature is as follows. The starting point is an
empirical model of the industry under consideration with three elements: demand, cost, and equilib-
rium conditions. The demand side is estimated ﬁrst, independently of the supply side, using either
consumer-level data on individual transactions, or product level data on market shares and prices. On
the supply side, the cost function of a producer selling in a foreign country is speciﬁed to allow for
both a traded, and a non-traded, local (i.e., destination-market speciﬁc) component in this producer’s
costs. The distinction between traded and non-traded costs is based on the currency in which these
costs are paid. Traded costs are by deﬁnition incurred by the seller in her home country. As such, they
are subject to shocks caused by variation in the nominal exchange rate when they are expressed in the
destination-market currency. In contrast, non-traded costs are deﬁned as those costs not aﬀected by
exchange rate changes. Costs are treated as unobservable. Assuming that ﬁrms act as proﬁt maximiz-
ers, the market structure of the industry in conjunction with assumptions regarding ﬁrms’ strategic
1behavior imply a set of ﬁrst-order conditions. Once the demand side parameters are estimated, these
ﬁrst-order conditions can be exploited to back out marginal costs and markups. Based on the speciﬁed
cost function, marginal costs are further decomposed into a traded and non-traded component. With
this decomposition in place, one then examines how the particular components of prices (traded cost
component, non-traded cost component, and markup) respond to exchange-rate shocks, and the lack
of price response attributed to either markup adjustment or to the presence of a local, non-traded cost
component. While the results of this decomposition naturally vary by industry, existing studies are in
agreement that markup adjustment is a big part of the story. The observed exchange-rate pass-through
is however too low to be explained by markup adjustment alone; accordingly, the role attributed to
non-traded costs in the incomplete price response is non-trivial.
While this framework allows one to evaluate the relative contributions of markup adjustment and
non-traded costs in the incomplete exchange-rate pass-through, it is inherently unsuitable to assess the
role of the third source of the incomplete price response: the existence of ﬁxed costs of repricing. There
are two reasons for this inadequacy. The ﬁrst is a conceptual one. A key element of the framework
described above is the premise that ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order conditions hold every period. Given that by
assumption ﬁrms are always at the equilibrium implied by their static proﬁt-maximizing conditions,
there is no role in this framework for price adjustment costs that would cause ﬁrms to (temporarily)
deviate from their static optimum. The second reason is a practical one. Because the data used in
most previous studies are either annual or monthly as well as aggregated across product categories,
one observes prices changing every period, which makes it impossible to identify the role of adjustment
costs, which by their nature imply that prices should sometimes remain ﬁxed. To the extent that
such price rigidities are present, they may be masked by the aggregation across the product lines and
time periods (e.g., weeks) over which nominal prices may exhibit inertia. This use of aggregate data
may lead the literature to overstate the role of non-traded services, as whatever portion of incomplete
pass-through cannot be accounted for by markup adjustment will by construction be attributed to
non-traded costs, when in reality (and in a more general approach) it could be due to the existence of
adjustment costs.
This paper attempts to overcome this shortcoming by introducing price rigidities into the model
along with an approach for quantifying their importance in the incomplete pass-through of exchange-
rate shocks. To this end, we introduce two new elements. The ﬁrst is to modify the standard framework
of proﬁt maximization to allow ﬁrms to deviate from their ﬁrst-order conditions when faced with ﬁxed
costs of repricing. We deﬁne repricing costs in the broadest possible sense as all factors that may
cause ﬁrms to keep their prices constant, and hence potentially deviate from the optimum implied by
static proﬁt maximization. These may include small costs of re-pricing (the so-called “menu-costs”)
as well as more substantive costs associated with management’s time and eﬀort to ﬁgure out a new
optimal price, the additional costs of advertising and more generally communicating the price change
2to consumers, and — to the extent that one wants to incorporate dynamic considerations in the analysis
— the option value of keeping the price unchanged in the face of ongoing uncertainty.
The second innovation of the paper is on the data side. To identify the role of nominal price
rigidities we use higher frequency (weekly) data on the prices of highly disaggregate, well-deﬁned
product lines. The advantage of using high-frequency data is that we observe many periods in which
a product’s price does not change, followed by a discrete jump of its price to a new level. It is this
discreteness in ﬁrms’ price adjustment that we exploit to identify the role of nominal price rigidities.
The basic idea behind our approach is as follows. Even with nominal price rigidities, we can estimate
the demand and cost parameters of the model along the lines of earlier papers by constraining the
estimation to the periods in which we observe price adjustment; the underlying premise being that
once a ﬁrm decides to incur the adjustment cost associated with a price change, it will set the product’s
price according to the ﬁrst-order conditions of its proﬁt maximization problem. This does not imply
that this ﬁrm’s behavior will not be aﬀected by the existence of price rigidities. Such rigidities may still
have an indirect eﬀect on its pricing behavior. As in any standard model of oligopolistic interaction,
in choosing a new price, a ﬁrm will take the prices (or quantities) of its competitors into account. If its
competitors’ prices do not change in a given period, possibly because of their nominal price rigidities,
this will aﬀect its choice of an optimal price. Our estimation procedure takes this indirect eﬀect into
account.
Once the model parameters are estimated, we exploit information from both periods when prices
change and do not change to derive bounds to the adjustment costs associated with a price change.
This derivation draws on a revealed-preference-approach, based on the insight that in periods in which
a product’s price changes, its price-adjustment cost must be lower than the additional proﬁtt h eﬁrm
makes by changing its price. We use this insight to derive an upper bound to this price adjustment
cost. Similarly, in periods in which a product’s price does not change, its price-adjustment cost must
exceed the extra proﬁta s s o c i a t e dw i t hap r i c ec h a n g e .W eu s et h i si n s i g h tt od e r i v eal o w e rb o u n df o r
the price adjustment cost.
The costs of price adjustment is a concept that has a precise meaning within the context of our
model.I ti sd e ﬁned in the broadest possible sense as everything that prevents a ﬁrm from adjusting its
price in a particular period. As such, our estimates of these costs are not directly comparable to those
obtained in earlier studies using diﬀerent methods (e.g., direct measurement or ﬁrm surveys).1 More
importantly, the adjustments costs alone do not allow a full assessment of the impact of nominal price
rigidities on exchange-rate pass-through. Because such rigidities have both a direct and an indirect
1Several studies try to measure price adjustment costs directly. Levy et al (1997) ﬁnd menu costs to equal 0.70 percent
of supermarkets’ revenue from time-use data. Dutta et al (1999) ﬁnd menu costs to equal 0.59 percent of drugstores’
revenue. A few detailed microeconomic studies have cast doubt on the importance of menu cost in price rigidity: Carlton
(1986) and Midrigan (2010) ﬁnd that ﬁrms change prices frequently and in small increments, which is not consistent with
a menu-cost explanation of price rigidity; Blinder et al (1998) ﬁnd in a direct survey that managers do not regard menu
costs as an important cause of price rigidity.
3(operating through the competitor prices) eﬀect on ﬁrms’ pricing behavior, it is possible that very
small rigidities induce signiﬁcant price inertia. To assess the full impact of price adjustment costs we
therefore perform simulations that compare ﬁrms’ pricing behavior in the presence of nominal price
rigidities to their behavior with fully ﬂexible prices. The diﬀerential response of prices across the two
scenarios is attributed to the eﬀect of nominal price rigidities. In the same procedure we also identify
the role of markup adjustment and non-traded costs in generating incomplete pass-through.
We apply the approach described above to weekly, store-level data for the beer market. The
beer market is well suited to investigating questions regarding exchange-rate pass-through and price
rigidities for several reasons: (1) a signiﬁcant fraction of brands are imported and hence aﬀected by
exchange-rate ﬂuctuations; (2) long-run exchange-rate pass-through onto consumer prices is low, on
the order of 5-10 percent; (3) highly disaggregate, weekly data are available with both wholesale and
retail prices which enable us to examine how prices respond at each stage of the distribution chain; (4)
the patterns of prices for beer are typical for the type of goods included in the CPI, as summarized
by Klenow and Malin (2010); in particular, “regular” prices remain constant over several weeks, but
there are periodic discounts from these regular prices (i.e., sales); (5) both non-traded local costs and
price rigidities are a-priori plausible; as noted above, weekly data reveal price inertia, both at the
wholesale and retail level, which is suggestive of price rigidities. While our particular assumptions
regarding demand and supply are tailored to the beer market, the general features of our approach can
be applied to any market for which high-frequency data are available, so the points of price adjustment
can be identiﬁed.
Perhaps the biggest caveat of our approach is its static nature. Dynamic considerations may aﬀect
the analysis in two ways. First, to the extent that consumers and/or retailers hold inventories of beer,
the demand- and supply-side parameter estimates obtained by the static approach may be biased.
On the demand side, Hendel and Nevo (2006a, 2006b) show that when consumers stockpile laundry
detergents in response to temporary price reductions, static demand estimates may overstate the long-
run price elasticities of demand by a factor of 2 to 6. On the supply side, Aguirregabiria (1999) analyzes
the pricing behavior of a retailer who holds inventories in a central store and delivers goods from it to
individual outlets. He shows that in the presence of ﬁxed ordering costs and nominal price rigidities
inventory dynamics have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the retailer’s decision to change a brand’s price;2
ignoring such dynamics may lead to biased estimates of the importance of nominal price rigidities.
Fortunately, these concerns regarding inventories appear to be less relevant in our market. For beer,
the industry lore is that consumers typically consume a six-pack within a few hours of its purchase,
so consumer stockpiling is not a ﬁrst-order concern.3 On the supply side, state and local regulations
concerning the distribution of all alcohol, including beer, in the market we study stipulate that it
2A similar point is made in Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010).
3See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. “Beer Shopper Poll,” 2005.
4is illegal for the central store of a retail chain to maintain inventories of beer and to deliver them
to individual outlets. This must be done by ﬁrms exclusively licensed to be distributors. It is also
illegal for beer to be transported from one outlet to another by the central store. So from the point
of view of the central store or the individual outlet, there is no inventory problem associated with
beer, unlike most other products which are distributed by the central store. As the central store
does not keep inventories of beer (indeed cannot by law), there is no relationship between inventory
decisions and prices. And there is no incentive for individual outlets to maintain inventories, as they
can get shipments each week from the distributor, rather than bearing the costs of holding inventories
themselves.
A second limitation of the static approach is that it does not explicitly model the fact that with
ongoing uncertainty and rational expectations there is an option value to not adjusting prices, which
will magnify the eﬀects of even small costs of adjustment - a point initially made by Dixit (1991). Failure
to model this option value may bias upwards adjustment cost estimates. Our approach is similar to
the models considered in Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Mankiw (1985) in which agents have myopic
expectations. While this is certainly a strong (and in many settings unreasonable) assumption, we note
that in our setting the primary source of uncertainty is exchange rates, which are highly persistent.
Indeed, the consensus among International economists is that exchange rates follow a random walk.
Therefore, the assumption of myopic expectations appears more reasonable in the context of exchange
rates than in the case of other cost shocks, which may exhibit less persistence. We discuss these issues
in more detail in Section 3.4. In addition, we report results from a series of robustness checks that
show that our conclusions are robust to relaxing the assumption of ﬁrm myopia.
Our analysis yields several interesting ﬁndings. First, at the descriptive level, we document infre-
quent price adjustment both at the wholesale and retail level. However, this price inertia seems driven
primarily by infrequent adjustment of wholesale rather than retail prices. In our data, there is not
a single instance where a product’s retail price remains unchanged in response to a wholesale price
change. Hence it seems the primary reason retail prices do not change each period is that there is little
reason for them to do so, as the underlying wholesale prices remain ﬁxed. As we noted above, nominal
price rigidities may aﬀect the pricing decisions of a particular producer in two ways. First, they may
prevent this producer from adjusting her price, because her own costs of repricing exceed the beneﬁts,
even when all other competing producers adjust their prices (direct eﬀect). Second, such costs may
induce other competing producers to keep their prices ﬁxed, which may make price adjustment less
proﬁtable for the producer under consideration (indirect/strategic eﬀect). Our simulations indicate
that the direct eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the wholesale level, accounting for over 30 percent on average for
the incomplete pass-through. Interestingly, there is substantial variation in this estimate across brands;
the own costs of price adjustment appear to be more important for brands with large market shares
such as Corona and Heineken.I nc o n t r a s t ,w eﬁnd that at the retail level the own costs of repricing
5have no eﬀect. There is also an indirect/strategic eﬀect at the wholesale stage of the distribution chain
that accounts for approximately 1 percent of the overall incomplete pass-through, though over 30 per-
cent for the foreign brand with the smallest market share among those in the counterfactuals, Bass.
Our ﬁnal decomposition attributes 60.0 percent of the incomplete pass-through to local non-traded
costs, 8.2 percent to markup adjustment, 30.6 percent to the existence of own-brand price adjustment
costs, and 1.2 percent which represents the indirect/strategic eﬀect of such costs. The costs of price
adjustment, therefore, appear to be substantially more important at the wholesale than retail level.
It may be useful to distinguish between the general features of our approach that can be adopted
easily by other researchers and those speciﬁc to our application. The general features of our approach
include: the use of product-level price and market-share data along with limited demographic infor-
mation to estimate demand and markups; the use of a “revealed-preference-approach” that, combined
with ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order conditions of proﬁt maximization, allows us to compute bounds on their price ad-
justment costs; and the use of an accounting procedure to assess the relative importance of the sources
of incomplete exchange-rate pass-through. As noted above, we also believe that the assumption of my-
opic expectations is — independent of the particular industry under consideration — defendable in the
case of exchange-rate shocks, so that it can be adopted in other studies of exchange-rate pass-through.
But the speciﬁc assumptions of static demand and supply and of ﬁrms that are vertically-separated,
Bertrand-Nash competitors, cannot be applied as is to any given industry. A researcher will always
need to make speciﬁc assumptions to examine a particular industry, e.g., some industries may require
dynamics to be incorporated on the demand or supply side, while others may need a diﬀerent model of
vertical interaction. Our analysis does not provide a model that can be applied “oﬀ t h es h e l f ”t oa n y
industry, but rather a general approach that can be integrated with the institutional details of speciﬁc
markets to quantify the sources of incomplete pass-through.
Along the same lines, it is instructive to point out which features of the data drive our results
and how they generalize to other settings. In our approach, demand parameters and so markups are
identiﬁed from plausibly exogenous variation in relative prices across products over time (i.e., variation
from changes in input prices and bilateral exchange rates). Marginal costs are in turn identiﬁed as the
diﬀerence between prices and markups. Because markups are estimated to be relatively stable over
time, costs, expressed in local currency (U.S. dollars), also appear remarkably stable over time. In
the absence of repricing costs, this stability can only be rationalized by the presence of a local, non-
traded cost component that is not aﬀected by exchange rates. Put diﬀerently, the markup adjustment
generated by a demand system that is estimated from the relative price changes observed in our data
is not suﬃcient to generate the low pass-through observed in the data: Hence, in the absence of
nominal price rigidities, local non-traded costs will emerge as the dominant residual explanation. This
feature of the results is not unique to the beer market but has been consistently documented in many
micro studies that employ ﬂexible demand systems (e.g., Goldberg and Verboven, 2001; Hellerstein,
62008; Nakamura and Zerom, 2010). The contribution of our study is to allow for an additional — to
local, non-traded costs — source of price (and hence derived cost) stability: repricing costs. Once we
have estimated markups, we identify the role of price rigidities separately from that of non-traded
costs, by distinguishing between periods of price adjustment and non-adjustment. We ﬁnd that even
conditional on price adjustment, derived costs appear to be stable. This provides strong evidence in
favor of local, non-traded costs. On the other hand, these non-traded costs cannot completely account
for the fact that prices do not adjust at all in some periods: The latter can only be explained through
the existence of nominal rigidities. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of our results is that we still ﬁnd
local non-traded costs to be the primary source of incomplete exchange rate pass-through, accounting
on average for circa 60 percent of the incomplete response, despite the fact that we focus on a market
with infrequent price adjustment and allow for nominal rigidities. Thus, the substantial role attributed
to local non-traded costs in studies of exchange-rate pass-through appears to be a robust ﬁnding likely
to apply to multiple consumer markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. To set the stage, we start by describing the
market and the data and by examining the adjustment patterns in our retail and wholesale prices
in the next section. Section 3 discusses the model, Section 4 our empirical implementation and the
estimation and simulation results, and Section 5 concludes.
2D a t a
2.1 Overview
The beer market is particularly well suited for an exploration of the sources of local-currency price
stability for the reasons discussed in the Introduction: a signiﬁcant fraction of brands are imported;
exchange-rate pass-through to prices is generally low (below ten percent); both non-traded local costs
and price stickiness due to adjustment costs are a-priori plausible; last but not least, we have a rich
panel data set with weekly retail and wholesale prices. It is unusual to observe both retail and
wholesale prices for a single product over time. These data enable us to separate the role of local
non-traded costs and of adjustment costs in ﬁrms’ incomplete pass-through of exchange-rate shocks to
prices.
Our data come from Dominick’s Finer Foods, the second-largest supermarket chain in the Chicago
metropolitan area in the mid 1990s with a market share of roughly 20 percent. The data record the
retail and wholesale prices for each product sold by Dominick’s over a period of four years. They
were gathered by the Kilts Center for Marketing at the University of Chicago’s Graduate School of
Business and include aggregate retail volume market shares and retail and wholesale prices for every
major brand of beer sold in the U.S.4 Beer shipments in this market are handled by independent
4The data can be found at http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/kilts/research/db/dominicks/.
7wholesale distributors. The model we develop in the next section of the paper abstracts from this
additional step in the vertical chain, and assumes distributors are vertically integrated with brewers,
in the sense that brewers bear their distributors’ costs and control their pricing decisions. It is common
knowledge in the industry that brewers set their distributors’ prices through a practice known as resale
price maintenance and cover a signiﬁcant portion of their distributors’ marginal costs.5 This practice
makes the analysis of pricing behavior along the distribution chain relatively straight-forward, as one
can assume that distributors are, de facto, vertically integrated with brewers.
During the 1990s supermarkets increased the selection of beers they oﬀered as well as the total
shelf space devoted to beer. A study from this period found that beer was the tenth most frequently
purchased item and the seventh most proﬁtable item for the average U.S. supermarket.6 Supermarkets
sell approximately 20 percent of all beer consumed in the U.S.
In our data, we deﬁne a product as one six-pack serving of a brand of beer, quantity as the total
number of servings sold per week, and a market as one of Dominick’s price zones in one week. We
aggregate data from each Dominick’s store into one of two price zones (for more details about this
procedure, see Hellerstein, 2008). Products’ market shares are calculated with respect to the potential
market which is deﬁned as the total beer purchased each week in supermarkets by the residents of
the zip codes in which each Dominick’s s t o r ei sl o c a t e d . W ed e ﬁne the outside good to be all beer
sold by other supermarkets to residents of the same zip codes as well as all beer sales in the sample’s
Dominick’s stores not already included in our sample. We have a total of 16 brands in our sample, each
with 404 observations (202 weeks spanning the period from June 6, 1991 to June 1, 1995 in each of two
price zones). We supplement the Dominick’s data with information on manufacturer costs, product
characteristics, advertising, and the distribution of consumer demographics. Product characteristics
come from the ratings of a Consumer Reports study conducted in 1996. Summary statistics for the
price data and the characteristics data used in the demand estimation are provided in Table 1.
2.2 Preliminary Descriptive Results
We begin the analysis by documenting in several simple regressions whether Dominick’s imported-
beer prices are systematically related to movements in bilateral nominal exchange-rates. These results
provide a benchmark against which to measure the performance of the structural model. We estimate
three price equations:
ln
 =  +  +  + lne +  lnco +  (1)
5Features of the Dominicks’ wholesale-price data conﬁrm that brewers control distributors prices to the supermarket.
Across Dominicks’ stores, which may each be served by a diﬀerent distributor with an exclusive territory, the variation in
UPC-level wholesale prices is less than one cent. Asker (2004) notes that one cannot distinguish distributors by observing
the wholesale prices they charge to individual Dominicks stores. This supports industry lore that distributors pricing is
coordinated by brewers and is not set separately by each distributor to each retail outlet.
6Canadian Trade Commissioner (1998).
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ln
 =  +  +  + ln
 +  (3)
where the subscripts j, z, and t refer to product, zone, and week respectively; p is the product’s
retail price7; p is the product’s wholesale price; , ,a n d are product, week and zone dum-
mies respectively that proxy among other things for demand shocks that may aﬀect a brand’s price
independent of exchange rates; e is the bilateral nominal exchange rate (domestic-currency units per
unit of foreign currency); co denotes a set of variables that proxy for cost shocks that again may
aﬀect prices, including domestic (U.S.) wages, the price of barley in each country producing beer in
our sample, the price of electricity in the Chicago area, and, for foreign brands, wages in each beer
exporting country in our sample; and  is a random error term. All the variables are speciﬁed in levels,
not ﬁrst diﬀerences, as our focus is on the long-run pass-through of exchange rate changes, and not
the short-term dynamics.8
Table 2 reports results from OLS estimation of the pricing equations. Columns 2 and 4 report
results from speciﬁcations that include the full set of controls speciﬁed above, while in columns 1 and
3 the cost controls are omitted (as the latter do not vary at the weekly level). The results across the
two speciﬁcations are remarkably similar. The average pass-through elasticity  for the retail price is
6.7 percent and is signiﬁcant at the one-percent level. The regression establishes a roughly 7-percent
benchmark for the retailer’s pass-through elasticity, that we will try to explain within the framework
of the structural model. The fourth column of Table 2 reports similar results from estimation of
the wholesale-price pricing equation, equation (2): Its pass-through elasticity is 4.7 percent, and the
coeﬃcient is again highly signiﬁcant. Finally, the ﬁfth column of Table 2 reports the results from an
OLS regression of each brand’s retail price on its own wholesale price. The coeﬃcient on the wholesale
price is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 100, which is consistent with the results from the other columns:
Exchange-rate shocks that are passed on by manufacturers to the retailer appear to be immediately
and almost fully passed on to consumer prices.
This preliminary analysis reveals that local-currency price stability is an important feature of this
market: only around 7 percent of an exchange-rate change is transmitted to a beer’s retail price. Where
does the other 93 percent go? As we note in the Introduction the exchange-rate pass-through literature
has identiﬁed three potential sources of this incomplete transmission: a non-traded cost component
in the manufacturing of traded goods, variable markups, and nominal price rigidities. Our structural
7Imported beer is generally invoiced and paid for in U.S. dollars in this market. We do not believe this practice
“explains” the observed incomplete pass-through: It simply restates the problem. A ﬁrm’s decision to price in dollars
to keep its local-currency prices constant still begs the question of why it wants its price constant, which our analysis
addresses: Note that it implicitly assumes an identical relationship across manufacturers between their exposure to
exchange-rate shocks and their invoicing strategy.
8It is not necessary, therefore, for import payments to be made on a weekly basis for us to identify the long-run impact
of exchange-rate shocks on prices using this speciﬁcation.
9model, introduced in the next section, quantiﬁes the relative contribution of each of these sources in
explaining this overwhelmingly incomplete pass-through.
2.3 Patterns of Price Adjustment in the Data
A rough idea of the timing and frequency of price changes in the beer market can be obtained from
Figure 1, which plots the retail and wholesale prices for a six-pack of the British brand Bass Ale.T h e
ﬁgure covers the full sample period, from the middle of 1991 to the middle of 1995. The plot serves
to illustrate several interesting points. First, the ﬁgure demonstrates the advantage of observing price
data at a weekly frequency. Such data are ideal for analyzing the role of price stickiness, since we clearly
see prices remaining constant for several weeks, and then jumping up (in a discrete step) to a new level.
This pattern in the price adjustment process is exactly the one we would expect with price stickiness.
That said, by itself, the infrequent adjustment of prices is not deﬁnitive proof that price rigidities exist,
as it is in principle possible that prices do not change simply because nothing else changes. Second, a
substantial fraction of the price variation reﬂects temporary price reductions (sales). As we discuss in
Section 3.4, these sales appear to be random in our sample, in the sense that we cannot ﬁnd anything
that predicts the timing of a sale. This has important implications for the demand estimation. Third,
a striking feature of Figure 1 is that retail prices always adjust when wholesale prices adjust. So it
seems that the main reason retail prices do not change in this market is that there is little reason for
them to change (the cost facing retailers as measured by the wholesale price does not change). This
contrasts with the pattern we observe at the wholesale level: despite enormous variation in exogenous
(to the industry) factors aﬀecting manufacturer costs (i.e., exchange-rate ﬂuctuations), wholesale prices
remain unchanged for long periods of time. A ﬁnal point that Figure 1 together with similar plots for
other brands illustrate is that price adjustment is not synchronized across brands. Given the strategic
interactions between ﬁrms, this asynchronous price adjustment may generate signiﬁcant price inertia,
even if the nominal price rigidities facing each individual manufacturer or retailer are small.
3M o d e l
We describe here the supply and demand sides of the model we use to identify the sources of incomplete
exchange rate pass-through, in particular, the role of price rigidities.
3.1 Supply
We model the supply side of the market using a linear-pricing model in which manufacturers, acting as
Bertrand oligopolists with diﬀerentiated products, set their prices followed by retailers who set their
prices taking the wholesale prices they observe as given. Thus, a double markup is added to the
10marginal cost of the product before it reaches the consumer.9 Our approach builds on Hellerstein’s
(2008) work on the beer market, but makes one key modiﬁcation to her model: We introduce price
rigidities both at the wholesale and retail level; the eﬀect of these price rigidities is to cause ﬁrms to
potentially deviate from their ﬁrst-order conditions.
The strategic interaction between the manufacturer and retailer is as follows. First, the manufac-
turer decides whether or not to change its product’s price taking into account the current period’s
observables (costs, demand conditions, and competitor prices), and the retailer’s anticipated reaction.
If she decides to change the price, then the new price is determined based on the manufacturer’s ﬁrst-
order conditions. Otherwise the wholesale price is the same as in the previous period. Next, the retailer
observes the wholesale price set by the manufacturer and decides whether or not to change the same
product’s retail price. If the retail price changes, then the new retail price is determined according to
the retailer’s ﬁrst-order conditions. Otherwise the retail price is the same as in the previous period.
To characterize the equilibrium we use backward induction and solve the retailer’s problem ﬁrst.
3.1.1 Retailer
Consider a retail ﬁrm that sells all of the market’s J diﬀerentiated products. Let all ﬁrms use linear














The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep r o ﬁt expression is standard. The variable p
 is the price the retailer sets for
product j, p
 is the wholesale price paid by the retailer for product j, ntc
 are local non-traded10
costs paid by the retailer to sell product j and s(p

) is the quantity demanded of product j which is
a function of the prices of all J products. The new element in our approach is the introduction of the
second term, 
, which captures the ﬁxed cost of changing the price of product j at time t.T h i sc o s t
is zero if the price remains unchanged from the previous period, but takes on a positive value, known





  0 if 
 6= 
−1 (5)
We interpret the adjustment cost 
 as capturing all possible sources of price rigidity. These can
include the management’s cost of calculating the new price; the marketing and advertising expenditures
associated with communicating the new price to customers; the costs of printing and posting new price
9In modeling the industry’s vertical relationships we draw on previous work (Hellerstein, 2004) that used both industry
lore and formal non-nested tests developed by Villas-Boas (2007) to choose the model that best ﬁts the data.
10We use the term “non-traded” to indicate that these costs are paid in dollars regardless of the origin of the product,
and so will not be aﬀected by exchange-rate shocks.
11tags, etc. The particular interpretation of 
 is not important for our purposes. What is important
is that it is a discrete cost that the retailer pays every time the price adjusts from the previous period.
The indexing of  by product  and time  in our notation corresponds to the most ﬂexible speciﬁcation,
in which the price adjustment cost is allowed to vary by product and time. The implication of the
adjustment cost in the proﬁt function is that it can cause the retailer to deviate from its ﬁrst-order
conditions, even if it acts as a proﬁt maximizer. Speciﬁcally, in the data we will observe one of two
cases:
Case 1: The price changes from the previous period: 
 6= 
−1. In this case the retailer
solves the standard proﬁt maximization problem to determine the new optimal price, so the observed
retail price 











T h i sg i v e su sas e to fJ equations, one for each product. One can solve for the retailer’s markups by
deﬁning a J × J matrix Ω, called the retailer reaction matrix (the matrix of demand substitution





  =1 J that is the marginal change in the kth product’s
market share given a change in the jth product’s retail price.11 The stacked ﬁrst-order conditions







where the retail price for product j in market t will be the sum of its wholesale price, non-traded
costs, and markup. The presence of the adjustment costs 
 in the proﬁt function implies that if the
retailer changes her price in the current period, the extra proﬁts associated with the new price must







































−) denotes the counterfactual market share that product  would have, if the retailer
had kept the price unchanged at 
−1,a n d
− denotes the other products’p r i c e st h a tm a yo rm a y
not have changed from the previous period. This inequality states that the proﬁts the retailer makes
by adjusting product 0 price in the current period must be greater than the proﬁts she would have
11The Ω matrix is pre-multiplied by J × J matrix T
 with the jth, kth element equal to 1 if both products j and k
are sold by the retailer, and zero otherwise. In our application, 
 i sa l lo n e ss ow eo m i ti tf o rs i m p l i c i t y .
12achieved, had she left the price unchanged (in which case the ﬁrst-order condition of proﬁt maximization
would have been violated, but she would have saved on the adjustment cost 
). In this sense, it simply
captures a “revealed-preference” argument.12 By rearranging terms we can use the above inequality
to derive an upper bound 

































Case 2: The price remains unchanged from the previous period: 
 = 
−1. In this
case the ﬁrst-order conditions of proﬁt maximization do not necessarily hold. If the retailer does not
adjust product 0 price in period , then the proﬁts she makes from keeping the price constant must
be as large as the proﬁts she would have made from adjusting the price according to her ﬁrst-order






































 denotes the counterfactual price the retailer would have charged had she behaved according
to her optimality conditions, and 
(
 
−) the counterfactual market share corresponding to this
optimal price. As in Case 1, we rewrite this inequality to derive a lower bound 


































The heart of our empirical approach to quantify these adjustment costs is as follows. First, we estimate
the demand function. Once the demand parameters have been estimated, the market share function
(p





 can be treated as known. Next we
exploit the ﬁrst-order conditions for each product  to estimate the non-traded costs and markups of
product , but contrary to the approach typically employed in the Industrial Organization literature,
12This is one of a larger set of inequalities that potentially could be used to infer adjustment costs, as a multi-product
retailer may consider all possible permutations of price changes across the multiple products she oﬀers. Using a subset
containing a single inequality is suﬃcient to obtain consistent estimates of the bounds, however, given that our revealed
preference approach must hold for every individual permutation of price changes. The same logic applies to deriving the
retailer’s lower bounds as well as the manufacturers’ bounds.
13we use only the periods in which the price of product  adjusts, to back out costs and markups. In
periods when the price does not adjust, the non-traded costs are not identiﬁed from the ﬁrst-order
conditions; however, we can derive estimates of them by imposing some additional structure on the
problem, i.e. by modeling non-traded costs parametrically as a function of observables. With these in
hand, we calculate the counterfactual price 
 the retailer would have charged if there were no price
rigidities and she behaved according to the proﬁt maximization conditions, as well as the associated
counterfactual market share 
(

−).I n t h e ﬁnal step, we exploit inequalities (9) and (11) to
derive upper and lower bounds to the adjustment costs 
.
Note that in this approach price rigidities, as captured by the adjustment cost 
 aﬀect pricing
behavior in two ways. First, there is a direct eﬀect: They may prevent the retailer from changing a
price if the adjustment cost associated with this change exceeds the additional proﬁt. Second, there
is an indirect eﬀect operating through competing products’ prices. When the retailer sets the price
of product , she conditions on the prices of competing products. If these prices remain constant,
possibly because of the presence of nominal price rigidities, then the size of product 0 price change
may be smaller than if these rigidities were not present. The existence of this indirect eﬀect means that
relatively small adjustment costs may lead to signiﬁcant price inertia. Accordingly, the magnitude of
the adjustment costs is not, in itself, very informative. To assess the overall impact of price adjustment
costs, one must perform simulations to compare ﬁrms’ pricing behavior in the presence and absence of
these costs.
3.1.2 Manufacturers
Let there be M manufacturers that each produce some subset  of the market’s J diﬀerentiated
products. Each manufacturer chooses its wholesale price p
 taking the retailer’s anticipated behavior














 )) − 
 (12)
where 
 is the marginal cost incurred by the manufacturer to produce and sell product j,w h i c hi n
turn is a function of traded costs tc
 and destination-market speciﬁc non-traded costs ntc
.A sn o t e d
above, the distinction between traded and non-traded costs is based on the currency in which these
costs are paid; traded costs are by deﬁnition incurred in the manufacturer’s home country currency,
and subject to exchange rate shocks, while (dollar-denominated) non-traded costs are not. The term

 denotes the price adjustment cost incurred by the manufacturer. The interpretation of this cost
is similar to that for the retail adjustment cost; it is a discrete cost paid only when the manufacturer





  0 if 
 6= 
−1 (13)
We use the same procedure we applied to the retailer’s problem to derive upper and lower bounds
to the manufacturer adjustment cost. The derivation of the manufacturer bounds is, however, more
complicated as he must account for the possibility that the retailer does not adjust her price due to
the presence of a retail adjustment cost. In the data we observe one of two cases:
Case 1: The wholesale price changes from the previous period: 
 6= 
−1. Due to the
existence of the retail adjustment cost, it is, in principle, possible in this case that the retail price
does not adjust, while the wholesale price does. However, in our data we do not observe a single
instance of this occurring. We therefore concentrate our discussion on the case where the retail price
adjusts when the wholesale price adjusts. Assuming that manufacturers act as proﬁt maximizers, each
wholesale price 


















  the change in each product’s market share with respect to a change
in each product’s wholesale price.13 The manufacturer’s reaction matrix is a transformation of the
retailer’s reaction matrix: Ω = Ω0
Ω where Ω is a J-by-J matrix of the partial derivative of each
retail price with respect to each product’s wholesale price. Each column of Ω contains the entries of
a response matrix computed without observing the retailer’s marginal costs.14
For the case with adjustment costs, note that we are able to compute this matrix even though we,
as researchers, do not observe the retailer adjustment costs. The reason is that for Ω to be evaluated,
all that is required is that the manufacturer knows if the retailer will adjust the prices of her products.
But in our complete information setup, the manufacturer knows the adjustment costs of the retailer
(even though we do not) and, thus, can solve the model to compute the optimal response of the retailer.
At the equilibrium, the observed response of the retailer in the data has to correspond to the response
assumed by the manufacturer. Otherwise, the observed responses would not be consistent with an
equilibrium. Accordingly, we compute Ω by setting the manufacturer’s expectation regarding the
retailer’s price adjustment equal to the adjustment of the retailer observed in the data. Note that we
13Ω is preceded by an ownership matrix, J × J matrix T
 with the jth, kth element equal to 1 if both products j
and k are produced by the same manufacturer, and zero otherwise, which we omit for simplicity. Two manufacturers are
modeled as multiproduct ﬁrms, Heineken N.V. which owned Amstel and Heineken over the sample period, and Guinness
PLC, which owned Guinness and Harp.
14To obtain expressions for this matrix, one uses the implicit-function theorem to totally diﬀerentiate the retailer’s
ﬁrst-order condition for product  with respect to all retail prices and with respect to the manufacturer’s price p

 .T h e
properties of this matrix are described in greater detail in Villas-Boas (2007) for the case with no adjustment costs.
15do not need to know the retailer adjustment costs to do this. The manufacturers’ marginal costs are





Each wholesale price is the sum of the manufacturer traded costs, non-traded costs, and markup
function. Each manufacturer can use her estimate of the retailer’s non-traded costs and reaction
function to compute how a change in her price will aﬀect the retail price for the product.
If the manufacturer changed her price from the previous period, the proﬁt ss h em a d ef r o mc h a n g i n g
the price (net of the price adjustment cost 
) must have exceeded the proﬁts that she would have
































This condition is similar to inequality (9) for the retailer, with one diﬀerence: the counterfactual
market share 
 that the manufacturer would face if she left the price of product  unchanged is
a function of the counterfactual retail price 
 that the retailer would charge when faced with an
unchanged wholesale price 
−1 as well as the counterfactual retail prices 
− of the other products
oﬀered by the retailer; the same applies to the counterfactual market shares 
 of the other products
sold by this manufacturer,  ∈ . This poses the following problem: Given the existence of retailer
adjustment costs, the counterfactual retail prices may or may not change from the previous period. To
assess the manufacturer’s beliefs about the retailer’s behavior, we need to know the retailer adjustment
costs; however, the procedure described in the previous subsection allows us to derive only bounds,
and not point estimates of these costs. Because the scenarios involved in the computation of 

and 
− are counterfactual and by deﬁnition not observed in practice, we can no longer invoke the
equilibrium conditions, as when computing the matrix Ω, to infer the retailer adjustment behavior
the manufacturer uses in her optimization from the retail price changes observed in the data.
We deal with this issue in the following way. Consider 
 ﬁrst. As noted earlier, in our data
we almost never observe that the retail price of a product adjusts when its wholesale price does not.
We interpret this pattern as indirect evidence that the manufacturer assumes that whenever she does





−1. We emphasize that the justiﬁcation of this approach is not b a s e do na ne q u i l i b r i u m
notion; rather, it reﬂects a conjecture that is justiﬁed purely on empirical grounds, namely based on
16the observation that in the data retail price changes occur only when wholesale prices change.15
To compute the counterfactual prices of the other products, 
−, we again rely on the observation
that empirically the retail price of a product almost never changes when only the wholesale prices
of other products change; it only changes if the wholesale price of the same product has changed
from the previous period. Accordingly, if the retail price of another product did not change from the
previous period, we do not change the price of that product in the counterfactual either; however, if
the price of that product has changed from the previous period, we compute a new counterfactual
price based on the retailer’s optimization conditions. Once these counterfactual prices and shares have
been computed, the upper bound to the manufacturer’s adjustment cost 

































Case 2: The wholesale price does not change from the previous period: 
 = 
−1. The
lack of price adjustment in this case implies that the wholesale price is not necessarily determined by
the manufacturer ﬁrst-order condition. Regarding the retail price, it is again possible that the retailer
adjusts her price in periods when the wholesale price does not change. However, in practice we do
not observe this case in the data. Hence, we concentrate on the case where both wholesale and retail




−1. Given that the manufacturer does not
adjust the wholesale price, the proﬁts she makes at 
−1 must be at least as large as the proﬁts h e
would have made had she changed the price to a counterfactual wholesale price 
 according to her
15Given that this approach is based on a conjecture, we examine the robustness of our results to alternative ways of
computing counterfactual prices as follows. Note that in the case under consideration, the retail price for product  has
adjusted; accordingly, we have an upper bound for the retailer adjustment cost for that period from solving the retailer’s
problem in the previous subsection. We can therefore solve the retailer’s problem again under the premise that the retailer
adjusts her price, even though the wholesale price did not change, use the retailer FOC to determine the optimal retail
price in this case, and then insert our estimate of the upper bound to the retailer adjustment cost from inequality (9) to
determine whether it is indeed optimal for the retailer to adjust her price. The drawback of this approach is that the
use of the upper bound of the retailer adjustment cost biases the results towards ﬁnding that the retailer will not adjust.
Therefore, we also conduct an alternative robustness check, in which we use an average of the lower bounds (obtained for
diﬀerent periods) to conduct the same calculations. In both cases, we ﬁnd that the retailer’s optimal response is not to
adjust her price if the wholesale price did not change from the previous period. Intuitively, this happens because when
comparing the retailer proﬁts for a product across two periods,  and −1, there are hardly any changes in the variables
aﬀecting proﬁts, unless the wholesale price of the product has changed.































As with the case of the retailer, we can exploit this insight to derive a lower bound 


































The main complication in deriving this lower bound is that to compute counterfactual prices and
market shares, we need to know the manufacturer’s belief about the retailer’s reaction if the wholesale
price changes. Given the existence of retailer adjustment costs, it is in principle possible that a
product’s retail price will not adjust in response to a wholesale price change. To ﬁnd the price 
 the
manufacturer would set if she were willing to incur the adjustment cost, we again rely on the patterns
observed in the data and assume that whenever the wholesaler adjusts, the retailer adjusts too and
sets a counterfactual retail price 
 that is determined based on the FOC of the retailer. In this case

 is determined according to equation (15) which reﬂects the manufacturer’s ﬁrst-order condition;
the inverted manufacturer reaction matrix Ω−1
 in this equation incorporates the optimal pass-through
of the wholesale price change onto the retail price. As with the derivation of the upper bounds, we
emphasize that the justiﬁcation for this strategy is empirical; but the patterns in the data are striking.
In principle, given the presence of retailer adjustment costs, it is conceivable that the retailer would ﬁnd
it optimal not to change the retail price when the manufacturer sets a new wholesale price; however,
we do not have a single instance in our data set where we observe such a pattern. Accordingly, we
believe that it is reasonable to assume that the manufacturer believes that whenever she adjusts the
price of a product, the retailer will adjust her price too.
Finally, regarding the prices of the other products sold by the retailer, the 
−’s, we employ the
same procedure described earlier to derive the upper bounds. If a product’s retail price did not change
from the previous period, then we keep its price constant in the counterfactuals (the justiﬁcation again
being that we almost never observe retail prices changing in response to wholesale price changes of
other products). If, on the other hand, a product’s retail price diﬀers from its previous period’s price,
then we allow the retailer to adjust its price optimally in response to the counterfactual wholesale price
set by the manufacturer (again, the idea being that the retailer, who already adjusted the product’s
price, would have set a diﬀerent price had she been confronted with a diﬀerent wholesale price, and so
18retail price, for product .)
3.2 Pass-through
To assess the overall impact of these adjustment costs on ﬁrms’ pricing behavior we employ simulations.
We ﬁrst compute the industry equilibrium that would emerge if a ﬁrm faced an exchange-rate shock
and prices were fully ﬂexible, that is, all adjustment costs were equal to zero. In a second set of
simulations, we compute the industry equilibrium under the presence of nominal rigidities. We interpret
the diﬀerential response of prices across the diﬀerent cases as a measure of the impact of nominal price
rigidities.
Our ﬁrst counterfactual simulates the eﬀect of a shock to foreign ﬁrms’ marginal costs (i.e., an
exchange-rate shock) on all ﬁrms’ wholesale and retail prices by computing a new Bertrand-Nash equi-
librium. Formally, suppose that an exchange-rate shock hits the traded component of the jth product’s
marginal cost (the component denominated in foreign currency). To compute the transmission of this
shock to wholesale prices, we substitute the new vector of traded marginal costs, tc∗
  into the system
of J nonlinear equations that characterize manufacturer pricing behavior, and then search for the
wholesale price vector p∗










To compute pass-through coeﬃcients at the retail level, we substitute the derived values of the
vector p∗
 into the system of J nonlinear equations for the retail ﬁr m s ,a n dt h e ns e a r c hf o rt h e
retail price vector p∗








After running each simulation, we use the new equilibrium wholesale and retail prices to compute
pass-through elasticities. The pass-through elasticity of the exchange-rate shock to the wholesale price
after accounting for manufacturer nontraded costs is(ln(
 + 
 )ln
 ) and after accounting
for manufacturer markup adjustment is (ln
 ln
 ) The pass-through elasticity to the retail
price after accounting for its non-traded costs is (ln(
 + 
)
 ) and after accounting for its
markup adjustment is (ln
ln
 ) The decomposition then computes the contributions of the
manufacturers’ and retailer’s non-traded costs, markup adjustment, and adjustment costs to the 1−
(ln
ln
 ) part of the original shock not passed through to the retail price, as we describe in
Appendix A.
193.3 Demand
The estimation of costs, markups, and adjustment costs requires consistent estimates of the demand
system as a ﬁrst step. Market demand is derived from a standard discrete-choice model of consumer
behavior. Given that the credibility of our results depends on the credibility of the demand system,
it is imperative to adopt as general and ﬂexible an approach as possible to model consumer behavior.
We use the BLP random-coeﬃcients model described in Hellerstein (2008), as this model was shown
to ﬁt the data well, while imposing very few restrictions on the curvature of demand. We provide here
a brief overview of the model, and refer the reader to Nevo (2001) and Hellerstein (2008) for a more
detailed discussion of the implementation. Let the indirect utility  of consumer i from consuming
product j at time t take the quasi-linear form:
 =  −  +  +  =  +  =1  =1  =1  (22)
The utility from consuming a given product is a function of a vector of product characteristics (xp)
where p are product prices, x are product characteristics observed by the econometrician, the consumer,
and the producer, and  are product characteristics observed by the producer and consumer but not









+ Π where D is a vector of demographics for consumer i,a n dΠ is a
matrix of coeﬃcients that characterize how consumer tastes vary with demographics. The demographic
draws give an empirical distribution for the observed consumer characteristics  Indirect utility can
be expressed in terms of mean utility = x−p+ and deviations (in vector notation) from
that mean =[ Π] ∗ [ ]:
 =  +  +  (23)
Consumers have the option of purchasing an “outside” good; that is, consumer i can choose not to
purchase any of the products in the sample (or not to purchase at all). The price of the outside good
is assumed to be set independently of the prices observed in the sample.16 The mean utility of the
outside good is normalized to be zero and constant over markets. Let A be the set of consumer traits
that induce purchase of good j. The market share of good j in market t is given by the probability that
16The existence of an “outside” good means that the focus on a single retailer (Dominick’s)d o e sn o ti m p l yt h a tt h i s
retailer has monopoly power in the local market. The eﬀect of local conditions is accounted for by the presence of this
outside good. When computing the price elasticities for each brand, we consider that consumers have the option of going
to other retail outlets to purchase beer. In equilibrium, the retailer and manufacturer decide how much to raise the price
of a brand following a foreign-cost shock after taking these elasticities into account. If consumers switch to domestic
brands not in our sample or purchase beers in another supermarket following a rise in Dominick’s prices, our model
will produce consistent estimates of pass-through elasticities. One limitation of this method of deriving the market’s
aggregate demand curve is that one must assume the price of the outside good remains constant, which does not allow
for strategic interactions between our retailer and other retailers in the same market.
20product j is chosen:  =
R
∈ ∗() where P∗(d) is the density of consumer characteristics  =[]
in the population. To compute this integral, one must make assumptions about the distribution of
consumer characteristics. We report estimates from two models. For diagnostic purposes, we initially
restrict heterogeneity in consumer tastes to enter only through the random shock , which is assumed
to be i.i.d. with a Type I extreme-value distribution. In the full random-coeﬃcients model, we make
the same assumptions about  but also allow heterogeneity in consumer preferences to enter through
an additional term  This allows for a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the demand curvature and
substitution patterns than permitted under the restrictions of the multinomial logit model. In the full
random-coeﬃcients model, the market share function is approximated by the smooth simulator which,










To estimate the demand parameters, we equate these predicted market shares to the observed mar-
ket shares and solve for the mean utility across consumers using a nonlinear generalized method-of-
moments procedure, following Berry et al (1995) and Nevo (2000), as we discuss in Section 4.1.
3.4 Discussion of the Main Assumptions
We discuss here several assumptions of our model that simplify both the consumer’s and the ﬁrm’s
problems by abstracting from various dynamic considerations. First, an important premise of our
analysis is that consumers do not hold inventories of beer and that the price reductions (sales) doc-
umented in Figures 1 and 2 are not systematically related to stockpiling behavior. Otherwise, our
static demand estimates would overstate the long-run price elasticities of demand (see Hendel and
Nevo, 2006a and 2006b). As we note in the Introduction, the industry lore is that the typical buyer
consumes beer within hours of its purchase, so stockpiling is not a ﬁrst-order concern. To investigate
further if sales exhibit a systematic pattern in our data, we estimated sales-determinant speciﬁcations
similar to those in Pesendorfer (2002). Interestingly, in our sample of beer brands, sales appear to
be random, in the sense that we did not ﬁnd anything that could predict the timing of a sale.17 In
particular, we did not ﬁnd that the time elapsed since a previous sale, holiday dummies, or sales for
other brands could predict a current sale for a particular brand.18 Our ﬁndings regarding the timing
17This apparent randomness of sales in our sample is also consistent with a Varian-type explanation for temporary
price reductions. A potential problem with such an explanation is that in Varian’s model ﬁrms randomize prices each
period, so that the notion of a “regular price” does not exist. However, in the Varian (1980) model there are no costs
of price adjustment. Introducing costs of price adjustment (as we do in this paper) can explain the existence of “regular
prices” that is evident in Figures 1 and 2 (Chung, 2009).
18Our results contrast with those of Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003, hereafter, CKR) who analyzed category-level
(e.g. “beer”) price indexes constructed from the same Dominick’s dataset we use and concluded that the average prices
of beer and other seasonal products declined during holidays and other peak demand periods due to more frequent retail
21of sales for beer are consistent with our premise throughout the paper that consumers do not store
beer, so that intertemporal considerations, while potentially important in other markets, are not a
ﬁrst-order concern here.19
A second key assumption we make on the supply side is that ﬁrms set prices to maximize proﬁts
on a weekly basis in a static framework. This in turn presumes they do not hold inventories. To the
extent that the retailer does hold inventories of beer, the supply-side estimates obtained by this static
approach may be biased. As we note in the Introduction, local and state regulations regarding the
distribution of alcohol make this concern second-order in our case. An additional piece of evidence
that stores do not hold beer inventories comes from the wholesale price series in Figures 1 and 2. In the
Dominick’s data, reported wholesale prices are based on average acquisition costs. If inventories were
large and moved slowly, we would not expect to observe the sharp round-trip drops of our wholesale
price graphs.
Perhaps the strongest assumption in our model is that ﬁrms maximize proﬁts myopically, period by
period. Even with static demand and supply, this assumption may seem implausible given ﬁxed costs
o fr e p r i c i n g ,w h i c hc r e a t ea no p t i o nv a l u et onot adjusting prices in the presence of ongoing uncertainty.
As shown by Dixit (1991), rational expectations imply that even very small costs of adjustment can
generate signiﬁcant price inertia. While the myopia assumption may seem implausible in a general
setting, we believe that it is rather inconsequential in the context of exchange-rate pass-through and
more generally, in other markets with very persistent cost shock processes. The consensus among
International economists is that exchange rates follow a random walk. This ﬁnding suggests that cost
shocks associated with exchange-rate movements are unlikely to be anticipated in advance, either in
magnitude or direction, and will be highly persistent. In a market where exchange-rate movements are
the primary source of uncertainty, the assumption that ﬁrms act as if the world will stay the same, at
least for the near future, is not essential to our conclusions. Of course, persistence is not the same as
permanence, and in that sense, the assumption that ﬁrms set prices under the premise that the shocks
will be the same in future periods, not just in expectation, but in realization, is strong.20
The most straightforward way to provide support for this feature of our model is to relax the
myopia assumption to show that it does not matter, in the sense that it does not aﬀect the bottom line
promotions. Our ﬁndings appear more supportive of the explanation oﬀered by Nevo and Hatzitaskos (2005) who, like
us, analyze the Dominick’s data at a more disaggregated (UPC) level than do CKR, and ﬁnd that shifts in the relative
demand for individual brands combined with changes in overall price sensitivities account for the lower average prices in
peak demand periods, rather than increased promotions.
19We emphasize that the patterns we observe in our beer data do not necessarily generalize to all other product
categories. In fact, there is substantial evidence from Pesendorfer (2002) and Hendel and Nevo (2006a; 2006b) that
intertemporal considerations, such as those emphasized in models by Sobel (1984) and Pesendorfer (2002), are important
in determining sales for products that are more storable.
20In addition to exchange rates, ﬁrms face other sources of cost variation (energy prices, the price of barley, etc.)
but the variation induced by these factors pales in comparison to that from exchange rates, as we show in Figure 1 of
Goldberg and Hellerstein (2007).
22of our results. While estimation of a dynamic model with rational expectations is not feasible, we can
consider the extreme opposite of myopia, namely, perfect foresight about the future. In Appendix B,
we report the results from a set of robustness checks that allow ﬁrms to optimize over longer horizons
while maintaining demand as in our baseline weekly model. We assume full information and provide
ﬁrms with perfect foresight about the realized values of all variables in the model, including their
own and competitors’ adjustment costs. We run versions of this alternative model in which ﬁrms
optimize over two, four, or six weeks, and obtain results that are very close to our baseline results.
This is not surprising, as the market does not change much over four to six weeks, and the main
source of any change, the exchange rate, is diﬃcult to predict and persistent. It is precisely this
unusual degree of persistence of exchange rates that underlies the robustness of our baseline results to
relaxing the assumption of ﬁrm myopia. This robustness indicates that our myopia assumption is a
reasonable approximation to a ﬁnite-horizon dynamic problem, which in turn approximates the true
inﬁnite horizon problem.
Finally, we have computed the ex-post errors ﬁrms make following a period of price adjustment by
not adjusting their prices (that is the losses ﬁrms incur in one week by not changing the price they have
set in an earlier period) and examined the correlation between these ex-post errors and observables
(exchange rates, local wages, etc.) at the time the price was last changed. We ﬁnd no evidence that
the ex-post errors are correlated with observables at the time of the price change. This result provides
support for our main premise that the shocks ﬁrms experience subsequent to a price change were not
f o r e c a s t a b l ea tt h et i m et h ep r i c ew a ss e ta n dt h e r e f o r ed i dn o ta ﬀect the choice of price.21
4 Empirical Implementation and Results
Our empirical approach has two components: estimation and simulation. In the estimation stage, we
estimate the demand parameters, the traded and non-traded costs and markups of the retailer and
manufacturers, and the upper and lower bounds on the price-adjustment costs. In the simulation
stage, we use these estimates to perform counterfactual simulations and to decompose the incomplete
transmission of exchange rate shocks to prices. This section describes each stage in turn.
4.1 Estimation
4.1.1 Demand estimation
The estimation of the demand system follows Hellerstein (2008). The demand parameters are identiﬁed
from plausibly exogenous variation in relative prices across products over time, generated though
21Dynamics may also enter the demand side through intertemporal eﬀects stemming, for example, from habit formation,
as explored by Froot and Klemperer (1989), Slade (1998), and Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010). We discuss this
issue further in Appendix C.
23changes in input prices and bilateral exchange rates. Consumers choose between individual products
over time, where a product is deﬁned as a bundle of characteristics, one of which is price. As prices are
not randomly assigned, we use input price changes that are signiﬁcant and exogenous to unobserved
changes in product characteristics to instrument for prices. Formally, to estimate our model’s demand
parameters we equate the predicted market shares from equation (24) to the observed shares, and solve
for the mean utility across all consumers using a nonlinear generalized method-of-moments (GMM)
procedure, following Berry et al (1995) and Nevo (2000). We model the mean utility associated with
product  at time  as follows:22
= d−p+∆ (25)
where the product ﬁxed eﬀects d proxy for both the observed characteristics  as deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n
(22) and the mean unobserved characteristics. The residual ∆ captures deviations of the unobserved
product characteristics from the mean (e.g., time-speciﬁc local promotional activity) and is likely to
b ec o r r e l a t e dw i t ht h ep r i c ep; for example, an increase in the product’s promotional activity may
simultaneously increase the mean evaluation of this product by consumers and a rise in its retail
price. Addressing this simultaneity bias requires ﬁnding appropriate instruments, a set of variables
 that are correlated with the product price p but orthogonal to the error term ∆.F a c t o rp r i c e s
and exchange rates satisfy this condition as they are unlikely to have any relationship to promotional
activities while they are by virtue of the supply relation correlated with product prices. To construct
our instruments we interact hourly wages in each country’s beverage industry with weekly bilateral
exchange rates and indicator variables for each brand; this allows each product’s price to respond
independently to a given supply shock.
Table 3 reports the results from the demand estimation using the multinomial logit model. Fol-
lowing the speciﬁcation in equation (25) we regress the mean utility, , which for the logit model is
deﬁned as ()−() on prices and product dummies. Due to its restrictive functional form, the
multinomial logit model will not produce credible estimates of pass-through. It is helpful, however, to
gauge how well the instruments for price perform in the logit demand estimation before turning to the
full random-coeﬃcients logit demand model. The table’s ﬁrst two columns report the ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimate for the mean price coeﬃcient,  and columns 3 and 4 for two instrumental
variables (IV) speciﬁcations, using as instruments for prices manufacturer factor prices interacted with
exchange rates and product ﬁxed eﬀects. Consumers should appear more sensitive to price once we
instrument for the impact of unobserved (by the econometrician, not by ﬁrms or consumers) changes
in product characteristics on their consumption choices. It is therefore promising that the mean price
coeﬃcient falls from about -0.92 in each OLS estimation to -2.43 in the two IV estimations. Columns
2 and 4 report results when a dummy for major holidays is included as an additional right-hand-side
22The demand model is also indexed by price zone , as our sample has observations for two separate price zones for
each period. To keep the exposition simple, we omit the subscript  from our notation.
24variable, as one might expect the coeﬃcient on price to diﬀer in periods of high demand for beer, such
as during major holidays. Including the holiday dummy as a right-hand-side variable does not aﬀect
the demand coeﬃcients in either the OLS or the IV estimation. Finally, Table 3 reports that the
ﬁrst-stage partial F-stat of the two IV speciﬁcations is high (over 34 in both cases), and accordingly
the F-test for zero coeﬃcients associated with the instruments is rejected, suggesting that factor costs
interacted with exchange rates are valid instruments.
Table 4 reports results from estimation of the full random-coeﬃcients logit demand system, in
which we allow consumers’ income to interact with their taste coeﬃcients for price and percent alcohol.
As we estimate the demand system using product ﬁxed eﬀects, we recover the mean consumer-taste
coeﬃcients in a generalized-least-squares regression of the estimated product ﬁxed eﬀects on product
characteristics (bitterness and percentage alcohol). The coeﬃcients on the characteristics generally
appear reasonable. The random coeﬃcient on income, at 38.45, is signiﬁcant at the ﬁve-percent level,
which implies that higher-income consumers are less price sensitive. Consistent with industry lore,
the mean preference in the population is amenable to a bitter taste in beer, which has a positive
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. As the percentage of alcohol rises across brands, the mean utility in the
population also rises, an intuitive result, though higher-income consumers’ utility falls, evident in the
negative and signiﬁcant random coeﬃcient of -50.36, and consistent with industry lore regarding the
typical consumer of light beer.23
The random-coeﬃcients logit demand system is ﬂexible in the dimension that matters most for a
pass-through analysis, the curvature of demand. In theory, it can accommodate a range of elasticities
and super-elasticities from CES to the Kimball (1995)-style kinked demand curve used in some of the
macroeconomic literature (e.g. Klenow and Willis, 2006; Dotsey and King, 2005). This ﬂexibility is
not available with the multinomial logit. The model’s parameters that characterize heterogeneity in
consumers’ tastes for various product characteristics, particularly their price sensitivity, also contribute
to the curvature of demand. As a ﬁrm raises its product’s price, more price-sensitive consumers will
respond by not purchasing the product or by dropping out of the market altogether (purchasing the
outside good), meaning the ﬁrm will retain only its less price-sensitive consumers, and aggregate
demand will appear more inelastic. Note that this eﬀect that arises from incorporating consumer
heterogeneity on the demand side will contribute to higher, not lower, pass-through.
One common measure of demand curvature is the “super-elasticity of demand,” the percentage
change in the demand elasticity for a given percentage-point change in prices (Klenow and Willis,
2006; Kimball, 1995). A Dixit-Stiglitz demand model has a super-elasticity of zero which generates
constant markups under monopolistic competition. A positive super-elasticity of demand implies
23We have checked that the demand system is robust to the Knittel and Metaxoglou (2008) critique that in a highly
nonlinear model such as a random-coeﬃcients demand system, the objective function may exhibit many local minima,
as we discuss in Appendix D.
25a concave demand curve: As a ﬁrm increases its price, it faces increasingly elastic demand. We
estimate the super-elasticity of demand to be 0.8 in our random-coeﬃcients model, that is, that a
10-percent increase in prices leads to an 8-percent increase in the absolute value of the price elasticity
of demand. In robustness checks that use alternative versions of the demand system with additional
random coeﬃcients, we ﬁnd the super-elasticity coeﬃcient to be generally close to 1, which generates
a reasonable incentive for ﬁrms to adjust their markups.
4.1.2 Computation of total retail costs, non-traded retail costs ntc
, and retail markups
Once we’ve estimated the parameters of the demand system, we know the market share function (p
)
as well as the own- and cross-price derivatives 

. W et h e nu s et h er e t a i l e r ’ sﬁrst-order conditions
for each product  in equation (6) to back out each product’s markups, which in turn enables us to
calculate the total marginal costs, including the non-traded retail costs, of product . Retail non-traded
costs are given by the diﬀerence between the retail marginal costs and the (observed) wholesale prices.
Under the assumption of no adjustment costs, these markups would be derived using the ﬁrst-order
conditions of every product in every period. Under the alternative assumption of some adjustment
costs, the markups are derived only for those products whose prices adjust. As discussed earlier, many
of the price changes in our data reﬂect promotions, during which a brand’s price is reduced for a few
weeks (see also Figures 1 and 2). A striking characteristic of these promotions is that prices return to
their exact pre-promotion level once the promotion is over. In theory, the transition from the discount
price to the pre-promotion level is a price change that could be handled in the same manner as a
level change in price (after all, ﬁrms incur some cost every time they change the posted price). Given
that ﬁrms charge exactly the same price as before the promotion, assuming these post-promotion
prices are determined by ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order conditions seems implausible. To be safe, we conducted
the empirical analysis both ways, ﬁrst applying the FOC’s to all periods in which the price changed
(including changes associated with promotions), and then excluding those time periods during which
ﬁrms charged the same price as before the promotion. The results did not diﬀer in any signiﬁcant
manner across the two approaches, as we discuss in Appendix B, but the second approach signiﬁcantly
reduces the number of observations associated with a price change that are available for the empirical
analysis. Still, in the remainder of the paper we report results based on this second, more conservative
approach.
Table 5 reports retail and wholesale prices and our estimates of markups and costs for selected
foreign brands. The markups appear reasonable and consistent with industry wisdom, on the order
of 5-10 percent of the retail price, which coincides with industry estimates of supermarkets’ average
markups on beer (Tremblay and Tremblay, 2005).
264.1.3 Estimation of non-traded retail cost function
The procedure described above allows us to back out the retailer’s non-traded costs for the periods
in which we observe a product’s price adjust, so we can reasonably assume that the retailer sets the
new price according to its ﬁrst-order conditions. However, this approach does not work for periods in
which the price does not change. To get estimates of the non-traded costs for these periods, we collect
the non-traded costs 
 from the periods in which the price of product  adjusted, and model them
parametrically as a function of observables:

 =  +  + 
 + 

where  are brand ﬁxed eﬀects,  are price-zone dummies, and 
 denote local wages. We run
this regression using data from periods with price adjustments, with the coeﬃcients reported in Table
6, and then use the parameter estimates to compute predicted non-traded costs for periods without
price adjustments. The results reported in Table 5 indicate that the retailer’s average non-traded
costs for each product ranges from about 30 to 40 cents for both the backed-out and the ﬁtted series,
which is a fairly narrow band given its average price of $5.52 for a six-pack of imported beer. One
exception is Bass, with an average retailer non-traded cost closer to 25 cents. As the retailer’s non-
traded costs are computed as the diﬀerence between the structural model’s derived total costs for
the retailer and the observed wholesale price, we expect that these cross-product diﬀerences primarily
reﬂect measurement error in our model’s estimates of the retailer’s total marginal costs.24 In addition,
Tremblay and Tremblay (2005) report signiﬁcantly lower advertising expenditure per barrel by Bass
relative to Corona and Heineken (one to two orders of magnitude diﬀerence) over the sample period.
To the extent that more promotional activity requires more labor inputs from the supermarket as a
complement, this would explain the diﬀerent estimated sizes of non-traded costs across these brands.
4.1.4 Derivation of bounds for the retailer price adjustment costs A

With the demand parameters and non-traded cost estimates in hand, we employ equations (9) and
(11) to derive the upper and lower bounds of the retailer adjustment costs 
. The computation of the




) that product  would have if the retailer did not change her price from
the previous period. This counterfactual share can easily be evaluated once the demand parameters
are estimated, given that the market share function is known. Note that when computing proﬁts in
each of our counterfactual scenarios (for both the retailer and manufacturer upper and lower bounds),
we assume that demand shocks are unchanged. Computing the lower bound based on equation (11)
24Some products may incur higher per-unit energy costs if they are refrigerated instead of “dry shelf” (not refrigerated
in industry parlance) though we do not have data on this for our market.
27requires calculating the counterfactual optimal price 
 the retailer would charge if she changed the
retail price from the previous period and the associated market share 
(
 
−). These are computed
using equation (7) which reﬂects the ﬁrst-order condition of the retailer. Note that each product’s upper
and lower bounds are identiﬁed over diﬀerent sample periods — for each product-market observation,
only one of the two can be estimated.
Table 7 reports the mean estimates of the upper and lower bounds on the retailer’s adjustment
costs for selected foreign brands. The upper and lower bounds generally are consistent for each brand
as well across the brands. The mean lower bounds on adjustment costs range from $6.16 for Bass
to $143.06 for Beck’s, with a mean lower bound across foreign brands of $45.36, and a mean upper
bound of almost $250. The entries in the third and fourth columns report the sum of the upper or
lower bounds for each brand’s price-adjustment costs divided by the retailer’s total revenue from that
brand over the full sample period. These numbers are more comparable to those of the Levy et al
(1997), Dutta et al (1999), and Klenow and Willis (2006) studies, which divide the costs of repricing
calculated for only those periods when prices change divided by the revenue earned by the ﬁrm across
all periods, whether prices change or not. The sum of the upper bounds to repricing costs across all
foreign brands is 3.13 percent of total revenue and for the lower bounds is 0.57 of total revenue. As
pointed out earlier, the particular estimates of price adjustment costs are not of interest here, as these
numbers are meaningful only in the context of our model. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd it interesting that
the order of magnitude of our estimates is similar that of other studies that use a completely diﬀerent
methodology.
4.1.5 Computation of manufacturer marginal costs, c
 , and manufacturer markups
This procedure is similar to that used to derive the retailer’s non-traded costs. In periods when the
wholesale price changes, manufacturers act according to their ﬁrst-order conditions, so we can use
equation (15) to back out their marginal costs c
. Manufacturers’ mean markup from our model is
44 cents, which given the mean retail price of $5.52 across our sample’s imported brands, is between 5
and 10 percent of the retail price, which matches precisely the industry estimates reported in Tremblay
and Tremblay (2005) and Consumer Reports (1996).
4.1.6 Estimation of manufacturer marginal cost function
The ﬁrst-order conditions allow us to back out the manufacturers’ total marginal costs, but do not
tell us how to decompose it into a traded and non-traded component. Further, it is not possible to
back out the marginal manufacturer costs in periods when wholesale prices do not adjust, given that
ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order conditions do not necessarily hold. To do this, we model total manufacturer costs
parametrically as a function of observables, and estimate this function using data from the periods of
28wholesale price adjustment only. We assume manufacturers’ marginal costs 
 take the form:

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 denote local domestic and foreign wages respectively,  is the bilateral exchange
rate between the producer country and the U.S.,  is the price of barley in the country of production
of brand ,  is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the product is produced by a foreign supplier, and zero
otherwise, and  is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the product is produced by a domestic supplier,
and zero otherwise. For the function to be homogeneous of degree 1 in factor prices, we require
 +  ∗  +  ∗  +  ∗  =1 .E q u a t i o n (27) can be estimated by Least Squares, which
serves two purposes. It allows us to, ﬁrst, decompose the total marginal cost into a traded and a
non-traded component, and second, to use its parameter estimates to construct predicted values for
the manufacturer traded and non-traded costs for periods in which wholesale prices do not change.
Recall that by deﬁnition the traded component refers to the part of the marginal cost that is
paid in foreign currency and hence subject to exchange-rate ﬂuctuations. For domestic producers the
traded component will be (by deﬁnition) zero. Foreign producers selling in the U.S. will generally
have both traded and local non-traded costs. The latter are captured in this speciﬁcation by the term
(
) that indicates the dependence of foreign producers’ marginal costs on local wages in the U.S.
The speciﬁcation in equation (26) can also be used to demonstrate two important facts about foreign
suppliers’ costs. First, foreign producers selling to the U.S. will typically experience substantially
more volatility than domestic producers due to their exposure to exchange-rate shocks. Second, if
the local non-traded cost component is nonzero (so  +   1), the dollar-denominated marginal
cost of foreign producers will change by a smaller proportion than the exchange rate. This incomplete
marginal-cost response may partially explain the incomplete response of prices to exchange-rate shocks.
Our estimate of the local content of foreign manufacturers’ marginal cost is the “domestic U.S.
wages” coeﬃcient that captures the cost share accounted for by domestic labor. As reported in Table
8, the highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of 0.61 indicates that the share of local costs is substantial, a ﬁnding
that is consistent with external evidence on the share of local costs in U.S. consumer goods.25 This
estimate implies that a big part of foreign manufacturers’ costs of selling in the U.S. market is not
25Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003), using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s input-output tables and the
1992 Census of Wholesale and Retail Trade, and Goldberg and Campa (2010), using data from the OECD’s input-output
tables, ﬁnd that local distribution services account for roughly half of the retail price of the average consumer good in
the U.S. Similarly, Goldberg and Verboven (2001) ﬁnd that local costs account for circa 65 percent of the incomplete
pass-through in the European auto industry.
29aﬀected by exchange-rate ﬂuctuations. Hence it comes as no surprise that foreign producers do not
fully adjust their U.S. dollar prices in response to exchange-rate changes. This ﬁnding indicates that
even without menu costs, the existence of local non-traded costs will generate a signiﬁcant degree of
inertia in local currency prices in this market.
4.1.7 Derivation of bounds for the wholesale price adjustment costs A

The ﬁnal step is to use the parameter estimates obtained in the previous steps to compute the upper
and lower bounds of the manufacturer price-adjustment costs based on equations (17) and (19).T h e
estimates of the manufacturers’ adjustment-cost bounds, reported in Table 9, are roughly the same
order of magnitude as those for the retailer, with upper bounds ranging from $36.76 for Bass to $310.44
for Beck’s, and lower bounds from $12.86 for Bass to $181.00 for Corona.26 The entries in the third
and fourth columns report the sum of the upper or lower bounds for each brand’s price-adjustment
costs divided by the manufacturer’s total revenue from that brand over the full sample period. The
sum of the upper bounds of repricing costs across all foreign brands is 1.28 percent of total revenue
and for the lower bounds is 0.61 percent of total revenue.
Recall that in our approach, adjustment costs are a “catch-all” term that captures anything that
may induce a ﬁrm not to change its price in a particular period - including concerns that it may lose
customers in the future, or the option value of not changing the price. The advantage of thinking
about adjustment costs this way is that it allows us to remain agnostic about their nature. As we state
above, we consider them in a sense a “residual” explanation that is needed to justify periods with no
adjustment. That said, one interesting and robust feature of our results is that the adjustment costs
associated with promotional price changes are substantially lower than those associated with regular
price changes, which suggests that to some extent these costs proxy for the managerial costs incurred
to ﬁgure out new prices. Table 10 reports the results of a ﬁxed-eﬀects panel regression of the derived
retail repricing costs on a dummy for a level change in a brand’s price as well as a dummy for sales, that
is, temporary price reductions. Adjustment costs appear to be signiﬁcantly higher for level changes in
prices, averaging about $850 for a “permanent” level price change, and closer to $50 for a temporary
price reduction. This ﬁnding is consistent with Kehoe and Midrigan (2010) who argue that the ﬁxed
cost of changing a regular price is larger than that of a temporary reduction.
26Note that, as in the case of the retailer, the manufacturers’ upper and lower bounds are not obtained over the
same sample periods. Our approach does not, therefore, gather information on the upper bounds to a product’s price
adjustment costs in periods when its price does not adjust, and similarly, on the lower bounds to its adjustment costs in
periods when its price does adjust.
304.2 Simulations
4.2.1 Counterfactuals
Using the full random-coeﬃcients model and the derived measures of traded, non-traded, and repricing
costs, we conduct a series of counterfactual experiments to assess how ﬁrms react to exchange-rate
shocks. We consider the eﬀect of a ﬁve-percent foreign-currency appreciation on foreign brands’ prices
in three scenarios, each with a diﬀerent assumption about the nature of the repricing costs faced by
foreign brands. We ﬁrst compute the industry equilibrium that would emerge if a foreign ﬁrm faced
an exchange-rate shock and prices were fully ﬂexible, with no repricing costs. In a second set of
simulations, we derive the industry equilibrium under the presence of nominal rigidities. We interpret
the diﬀerential response of prices across these cases as a measure of the impact of nominal price
rigidities.
In all of the counterfactuals with price-adjustment costs we use the mean of each brand’s estimated
upper bounds as our measure of the price-adjustment costs. We use the upper bounds because we
want to “bias” in some sense our ﬁndings towards assigning the largest possible eﬀect to nominal
price rigidities. As we explain in the Introduction, we developed the current approach to address the
criticism that earlier work, by assuming that ﬁrms always set prices optimally, had ignored nominal
price rigidities (notably Engel, 2002). Hence, we want to attribute the largest possible role to nominal
price rigidities, and see how this aﬀects our ﬁndings. The bottom line is that in the end, despite using
the upper bounds on the price-adjustment costs, we still ﬁnd that local non-traded costs are the most
signiﬁcant source of price inertia.
The counterfactual experiments consider the eﬀect of a ﬁve-percent appreciation of the relevant
foreign currency on the prices of a British, German, Mexican, and Dutch brand (Bass, Beck’s, Corona,
and Heineken, respectively) in twelve exercises reported in Table 11. There are three panels in the
table, each one corresponding to one of the simulations we describe below. For each counterfactual, we
report the median pass-through elasticity across the 404 markets in the sample. The ﬁrst column of the
table reports for each counterfactual the manufacturer pass-through elasticity of the original shock that
is due to local dollar-denominated costs incurred by the manufacturer. The second column reports
the pass-through of the original shock to the wholesale price that is attributable to manufacturer
markup adjustment. The third column reports the pass-through of the original shock to the retail
price due to the presence of a local component in retail costs. The last column reports the pass-
through of the original shock to the retail price due to the retailer’s markup adjustment. Given the
Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation for the manufacturers’ marginal costs in equation (27), the contribution
of local costs to generating incomplete pass-through will be captured by the coeﬃcient on domestic
wages . The diﬀerence between the manufacturers’ pass-through elasticity and that attributed to
non-traded costs will reﬂect markup adjustment on the part of the manufacturer. Similarly at the
31retail level, we can use our estimates of the retailer non-traded costs to compute the eﬀect of such
costs in generating incomplete pass-through of wholesale to retail prices; this eﬀect will be given by
(ln(
 +)ln
 ). The diﬀerence between the retailer’s pass-through elasticity and the elasticity
attributed to its non-traded costs will capture the markup adjustment by the retailer. (We discuss the
expressions used in the decomposition formally in Appendix A.)
Simulation 1: Simulate the eﬀect of a 5-percent appreciation of the relevant foreign
currency assuming that all prices are fully ﬂexible. The ﬁrst counterfactual experiment ex-
amines the manufacturers’ and the retailer’s pass-through following a 5-percent appreciation of the
relevant foreign currency when they face no repricing costs. Its results are reported in the top panel of
Table 11. The median pass-through of the exchange rate shock to manufacturer’s total marginal cost is
40 percent, which is determined by the coeﬃcient on local wages from the regression results reported
in Table 8. As the average non-traded cost incurred by a foreign manufacturer is over 50 percent
of her total costs, a nontrivial amount of non-traded value is added at this stage of the distribution
chain. Next, manufacturer markup adjustments are substantial in this counterfactual. Once these are
accounted for, the median pass-through elasticity of the exchange-rate shock to the wholesale price
ranges from 30.4 percent for Bass to 38.3 percent for Beck’s. It is 31.8 percent across all brands. It is
striking that our median wholesale pass-through elasticity across foreign brands is almost identical to
that of Hellerstein (2008) at 32.0 percent, which uses a similar dataset on beer from Dominick’s, but
aggregated up to a monthly frequency. Accounting for retail non-traded costs, the median pass-through
falls to 28.4 percent and ranges from 26.3 percent for Bass to 34.2 percent for Beck’s. Finally, the
median retailer pass-through elasticity across all brands is 26.2 percent. This counterfactual reveals
that the curvature of demand is such that the retailer passes through the bulk of its cost shocks to its
prices, rather than adjusting its markups. The median pass-through of the original shock to the retail
price ranges from 24.5 percent for Bass to 29.3 percent for Beck’s. Note that these results are larger
than the 5-10 percent retail pass-through elasticities estimated in Section 2.2.
We turn next to the case where nominal price rigidities are present. Because ﬁrms in our framework
are not symmetric, and price changes will not be synchronized, characterizing the equilibrium in this
case becomes extremely involved. To keep the problem tractable and still get a sense of how price
rigidities aﬀect prices, we conﬁne our discussion to two extreme cases; one in which the ﬁrm facing
the exchange-rate shock assumes all its competitors will adjust their prices, and a second in which it
assumes its competitor prices will remain ﬁxed due to their adjustment costs. These cases correspond
to the following two simulations:
Simulation 2: Simulate the eﬀect of a 5-percent appreciation of the relevant foreign
currency assuming that the foreign brand experiencing the exchange-rate shock faces no
price adjustment costs but assumes its competitors’ prices will remain ﬁxed. In this case,
the new industry equilibrium is computed as in Simulation 1, but with the additional restriction that
32all other products’ prices remain unchanged. This simulation captures the indirect or strategic aspect
of repricing costs; even if nominal rigidities do not prevent a given ﬁrm from adjusting its price, its
adjustment may be smaller if it assumes that nominal rigidities will keep competitors’ prices ﬁxed
compared to the case without any rigidities. In this simulation, competitive pressure from other man-
ufacturer repricing costs prevents Bass from adjusting its wholesale price, which translates to a zero
median manufacturer pass-through elasticity. This counterfactual also results in lower pass-through
elasticities for those brands whose prices do adjust (Becks, Corona, and Heineken) compared to Simu-
lation 1. This additional reduction in the pass-through elasticities also captures the indirect or strategic
eﬀect of repricing costs: Because each brand assumes that repricing costs will prevent its competitors
from changing their prices, its own response to the exchange-rate shock is less pronounced than un-
der ﬂexible prices. The largest reduction of this nature is for Heineken, whose median manufacturer
pass-through elasticity falls from almost 38 percent in Simulation 1 to 31.0 percent in Simulation 2,
and whose median retail elasticity falls from 29.3 percent in Simulation 1 to 7.5 percent in Simulation
2, an over 20-percentage-point decline attributable entirely to the strategic eﬀects of repricing costs.
The median retail pass-through elasticity across all four brands falls from 26.2 percent in Simulation
1 to 18 percent in Simulation 2, a modest but still notable 8 percentage-point drop.
Simulation 3: Simulate the eﬀect of a 5-percent appreciation of the relevant foreign
currency assuming the foreign brand aﬀected by the exchange-rate shock also incurs
price adjustment costs. This ﬁnal counterfactual experiment considers how manufacturers and
the retailer adjust their prices following a 5-percent appreciation of the relevant foreign currency if they
must incur price adjustment costs to alter their prices. As discussed earlier, we use the derived upper
bounds on manufacturers’ and the retailer’s price-adjustment costs in this ﬁnal set of counterfactuals,
whose results are reported in the bottom panel of Table 11. The median pass-through of the exchange-
rate change to manufacturers’ total marginal costs is again 40 percent as the share of non-traded costs
is unaﬀected by the nature of the counterfactual. But the manufacturer pass-through elasticities are
now zero across brands. Thus, accounting for a brand’s own price-adjustment costs reduces the median
manufacturer pass-through elasticity from 30.6 percent in Simulation 2 to 0 percent in Simulation 3.
This reduction is due to the zero transmission of the exchange-rate shock to the wholesale prices
of Becks, Corona, and Heineken due to these three brands’ manufacturer price adjustment costs.
In contrast, retail repricing costs do not contribute directly to the reduction in the pass-through
elasticities, though their indirect eﬀects played a role in Simulation 2. These results are consistent
with the patterns we documented earlier suggesting that retail prices always adjust whenever wholesale
prices adjust in this market. Simulation 3’s results may overstate the eﬀects of repricing costs in
lowering ﬁrms’ pass-through, as the counterfactuals use our derived upper bounds as their measures of
price adjustment costs. In addition, Table 11 reports the median pass-through elasticities across the
404 markets used in the counterfactual, as these are generally more robust than are means in this type
33of structural analysis. It may be instructive, however, to compare our mean pass-through elasticities
to the exchange-rate pass-through elasticities estimated in Section 2.2. The mean retail pass-through
elasticity across the four brands in this ﬁnal counterfactual is 10 percent, which is more comparable,
and quite close to the (mean) retail pass-through elasticity of 7 percent estimated via simple regressions
in Section 2.2.
4.2.2 Decomposition of the Incomplete Transmission
We next decompose the sources of the incomplete transmission of the exchange-rate shock to retail
prices that is documented in Table 11. The ﬁrst column of Table 12 reports the share of the incomplete
transmission that can be attributed to a local dollar-denominated cost component in manufacturers’
marginal costs. The second column reports the share that can be attributed to markup adjustment
by manufacturers following the shock (separate from any costs of repricing faced). Columns three
and seven report the shares of the incomplete transmission attributable to the eﬀect that the ﬁxed
costs of repricing faced by competitors have on the manufacturer and retailer’s pricing behaviors (the
indirect or strategic eﬀect). Columns four and eight report the shares of the incomplete transmission
attributable to price adjustment costs incurred by the manufacturer and retailer, respectively, when
they change their own prices (the direct eﬀect of price adjustment costs). The ﬁf t hc o l u m nr e p o r t s
the share attributable to a local-cost component in the retailer’s marginal costs, and the sixth column
the share attributable to the retailer’s markup adjustment, separate from any markup adjustment
associated with price adjustment costs.
Manufacturers’ local non-traded costs play the most signiﬁcant role in the incomplete transmission
of the original shock to retail prices. Following a 5-percent appreciation of the relevant foreign currency,
it is responsible for roughly half, or 60 percent, of the observed retail-price inertia. Manufacturers’
markup adjustment accounts for 8.2 percent of the remaining adjustment, their competitors’ price
adjustment costs for 1.2 percent, and their own price adjustment costs for another 30.6 percent. As
we noted above, the decomposition varies across brands by their market share. The brand with the
smallest market share, Bass, exhibits the greatest impact from other brands repricing costs on its pass-
through, at 30.4 percent. The results across the other three brands are quite similar: After accounting
for manufacturers’ own repricing costs, the retailer’s markup adjustment and own repricing costs can
only play a negligible role in explaining the incomplete transmission. These results support the initial
intuition conveyed by Figures 1 and 2 that the eﬀects of price adjustment costs are most evident in
the infrequent adjustment of wholesale prices, while such costs play only a minor role in explaining the
inertia of retail prices. It is important to emphasize that without incorporating manufacturer repricing
costs into our approach, however, we would conclude that local costs accounted for about 85 percent
of the incomplete pass-through at the wholesale level.
We ﬁnd, then, that the presence of a local, non-traded component in ﬁrms’ total costs seems
34the primary source of the incomplete transmission; local costs however cannot explain why prices
remain completely unchanged in several periods. To explain the latter, complete inertia, we need to
incorporate nominal price rigidities into the model. Our model does therefore a good job in generating
the pass-through patterns observed in the data.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper develops and estimates a model to identify the determinants of local-currency price stability
in the face of exchange-rate ﬂuctuations. The empirical model we develop incorporates the three po-
tential determinants identiﬁed by the literature: local non-traded costs; markup adjustment; and ﬁxed
costs of price adjustment. Our analysis yields several interesting ﬁndings. First, at the descriptive
level, we document that while both wholesale and retail prices do not change every period, retail prices
always respond to changes in wholesale prices. Hence, it appears that infrequent price adjustment is
primarily driven by the behavior of wholesale prices. Second, when we use our model to derive upper
and lower bounds to ﬁrms’ price-adjustment costs, we ﬁnd they are roughly of the same order of mag-
nitude for manufacturers and retailers in absolute terms, though smaller for manufacturers as a share
of their total revenue. Third, the counterfactual simulations we conduct to decompose the incom-
plete pass-through into its sources suggest that both local non-traded costs and a ﬁrm’s own repricing
costs are important in generating local-currency price stability. We ﬁnd mixed evidence regarding the
indirect strategic eﬀects of price adjustment costs: Their aggregate eﬀects are fairly subtle, though
they can have dramatic eﬀects on individual brands’ pricing behavior. Markup adjustment appears
more important at the manufacturer than the retail level, accounting on average for circa 8% of the
incomplete price response. Intuitively, these results are driven by the fact that in the data we observe
many periods during which prices remain completely unchanged; this complete inertia can only be ac-
counted for by nominal price rigidities. But the data also indicate that conditional on prices changing,
the response of prices to exchange rates is small; this incomplete response, conditional on adjustment,
is attributed primarily to local non-traded costs. Markup adjustment is present, but not suﬃcient
to rationalize the small size of price adjustments. Repricing costs aﬀect primarily the adjustment of
wholesale prices; their direct eﬀect on retail prices is very minor. Why nominal price rigidities operate
primarily at the wholesale but not retail level is, in our opinion, an intriguing question worth further
exploration. We hope that future research can shed more light on this issue.
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Figure 1: Weekly retail and wholesale prices for Bass Ale. Prices are for a single six-pack and are from
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PESO CRISIS PESO CRISIS
Figure 2: Weekly retail and wholesale prices for Corona. Prices are for a single six-pack and are from
Zone 1. 202 observations. Source: Dominick’s.
39Category Description Mean Median Std Dev
Prices Retail prices ($ per six-pack) 5.44 5.79 1.28
Wholesale prices ($ per six-pack) 4.36 4.61 1.00
Dummy for retail-price change (=1 if yes) .20 0 .40
Dummy for wholesale-price change (=1 if yes) .08 0 .27
Product characteristics Percent Alcohol 4.52 4.60 .68
Bitterness 2.50 2.10 1.08
Table 1: Summary statistics for prices and product characteristics for the 16 products in the sample.
























Table 2: Some preliminary descriptive results. The dependent variable is the retail or the wholesale price for
a six-pack of each brand of beer. The exchange-rate is the average of the previous week’s bilateral spot rate between
the foreign manufacturer’s country and the U.S. (dollars per unit of foreign currency). Includes brand, price-zone, and
week ﬁxed eﬀects. The second and fourth columns report results with controls for domestic and foreign costs. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, those starred signiﬁcant at the *5-percent or **1-percent level. 3636 observations. Source:
Authors’ calculations.
40Variable OLS OLS IV IV
Price -.93 -.92 -2.43 -2.43
(.01)∗∗ (.01)∗∗ (.35)∗∗ (.35)∗∗
Holiday .06 .001
(.02)∗∗ (.01)
First-Stage Partial F-Statistic 34.45 34.24
Table 3: Diagnostic results from the multinomial logit model of demand. The dependent variable is
()−(). Regressions include brand ﬁxed eﬀects. Huber-White robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Instruments: domestic wages in beverage industry interacted with brand ﬁxed eﬀects and with weekly nominal exchange
rates for foreign brands. 6464 observations. Source: Authors’ calculations.





Percent Alcohol 0.74 -50.36
(01)∗ (914)∗
Minimum-Distance Weighted 2 0.84
Table 4: Results from the full random-coeﬃcients logit model of demand. Asymptotically robust standard
errors in parentheses, those starred signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level. Model includes a constant whose coeﬃcient is not
reported. 6464 observations. Source: Authors’ calculations.
41Bass Becks Corona Heineken All Imports
Retailer
Price 6.36 5.27 5.10 5.66 5.52
(0.64) (0.48) (0.62) (0.70) (0.90)
Markup 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.41
(0.005)∗∗ (0.003)∗∗ (0.004)∗∗ (0.004)∗∗ (0.003)∗∗
Nontraded costs
Backed out 0.26 0.41 0.39 0.47 0.42
(0.070)∗∗ (0.045)∗∗ (0.091)∗∗ (0.070)∗∗ (0.038)∗∗
Fitted 0.24 0.38 0.36 0.45 0.38
(0.071)∗∗ (0.047)∗∗ (0.091)∗∗ (0.070)∗∗ (0.041)∗∗
Manufacturer
Price 5.76 4.44 4.27 4.99 4.69
(0.24) (0.16) (0.43) (0.28) (0.77)
Markup 0.51 0.40 0.40 0.53 0.44
(0.005)∗∗ (0.003)∗∗ (0.003)∗∗ (0.006)∗∗ (0.003)∗∗
Total costs
Backed out 5.28 4.04 3.83 4.59 4.41
(0.04)∗∗ (0.01)∗∗ (0.07)∗∗ (0.07)∗∗ (0.05)∗∗
Fitted 5.21 4.04 3.82 4.48 4.25
(0.03)∗∗ (0.01)∗∗ (0.05)∗∗ (0.07)∗∗ (0.02)∗∗
Table 5: Mean prices, markups, and costs for selected foreign brands. In the upper panel of the table, each
entry reports the mean across weeks and zones of the retailer’s prices, derived markups, and derived backed-out or ﬁtted
non-traded costs by brand in dollars per six-pack. In the lower panel of the table, each entry reports the mean across
weeks and zones of the manufacturer’s prices, derived markups, and derived backed-out or ﬁtted total costs by brand in
dollars per six-pack. The markups are price less marginal cost with the marginal costs derived from the structural model.
The numbers in parentheses under the prices are standard deviations over the sample, and under the other variables are
standard errors from bootstrap simulations with 400 draws. Those starred are signiﬁcant at the *5- or **1-percent level.
Source: Dominick’s; Authors’ calculations.
Variable Coeﬃcient




Table 6: Results from regressions of backed-out retailer non-traded costs on determinants. Depen-
dent variable is retailer’s non-traded cost which varies by week. Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Those starred are signiﬁcant at the *5- or **1-percent level. Source: Authors’ calculations.
42Mean Cost Share of Brand’s Revenue
Upper Bounds Lower Bounds Upper Bounds Lower Bounds
Brand ($) ($) (%) (%)
Bass $103.32 $6.16 3.05 0.18
(58.45)∗ (9.40)∗∗ (2.01) (0.31)∗∗
Beck’s $456.48 $143.06 4.25 1.33
(273.89)∗ (9.21)∗∗ (1.30)∗∗ (0.06)∗∗
Corona $131.36 $61.00 1.09 0.51
(70.95)∗ (41.99)∗ (0.54)∗∗ (0.0)∗∗
Heineken $621.12 $142.28 3.50 0.80
(249.73)∗∗ (30.00)∗∗ (1.77)∗∗ (0.16)∗∗
All $249.26 $45.36 3.13 0.57
(78.96)∗∗ (7.97)∗∗ (1.08)∗∗ (0.12)∗∗
Table 7: Bounds for the retailer’s adjustment costs for selected foreign brands. The entries in the ﬁrst
two columns report the mean over time of the dollar value of adjustment costs, and in the third and fourth columns the
mean over revenue for that brand over all markets whether the price changed or not. Standard errors from bootstrap
simulations with 400 draws reported in parentheses under each coeﬃcient. Starred coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the *10
or **5-percent level.
Variable Coeﬃcient
Domestic U.S. wages .61
(.11)∗∗





Table 8: Results from constrained linear regression of foreign manufacturer total backed-out costs
on determinants. Dependent variable is manufacturers’ total marginal costs for periods when the wholesale price
changes which varies by week. Includes brand and price-zone ﬁxed eﬀects. Starred coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the *5-
or **1-percent level. Source: Authors’ calculations.
43Mean Cost Share of Brand’s Revenue
Upper Bounds Lower Bounds Upper Bounds Lower Bounds
Brand ($) ($) (%) (%)
Bass $36.76 $12.86 0.80 0.28
(18.54)∗ (0.35)∗∗ (0.39)∗ (0.02)∗∗
Beck’s $310.44 $109.14 2.43 0.85
(121.45)∗∗ (21.25)∗∗ (0.85)∗∗ (0.15)∗∗
Corona $213.48 $181.00 1.41 1.20
(35.55)∗∗ (7.61)∗∗ (0.23)∗∗ (0.01)∗∗
Heineken $122.60 $112.38 0.22 0.20
(73.02)∗∗ (4.83)∗∗ (0.10)∗∗ (0.02)∗∗
All $178.60 $85.32 1.28 0.61
(50.31)∗∗ (3.03)∗∗ (0.34)∗∗ (0.02)∗∗
Table 9: Bounds for manufacturers’ adjustment costs for selected foreign brands. The entries in the ﬁrst
two columns report the mean over time of the dollar value of adjustment costs, and in the third and fourth columns the
mean over revenue for that brand over all markets whether the price changed or not. Standard errors from bootstrap
simulations with 400 draws reported in parentheses under each coeﬃcient. Starred coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the *10-
or **5-percent level.
Variable Coeﬃcient
Dummy for level change in retail price 852.75
(29.89)∗∗
Dummy for all retail price changes 50.20
(9.21)∗∗
Overall 2 .19
Table 10: Regression of retailer’s ﬁxed adjustment costs on a dummy for a level retail-price change.
The regression includes brand and price zone ﬁxed eﬀects. 3636 observations. Source: Authors’ calculations.
44Manufacturer Retailer
Markup Markup
Traded Adjustment Traded Adjustment
No repricing costs
Bass 40.0 30.4 26.3 24.5
(0.0)∗∗ (7.4)∗∗ (6.5)∗∗ (7.9)∗∗
Beck’s 40.0 38.3 34.2 29.3
(0.0)∗∗ (3.2)∗∗ (3.7)∗∗ (4.2)∗∗
Corona 40.0 31.9 28.1 25.7
(0.0)∗∗ (11.8)∗∗ (7.0)∗∗ (8.1)∗∗
Heineken 40.0 37.1 31.1 28.3
(0.0)∗∗ (5.6)∗∗ (6.1)∗∗ (5.9)∗∗
All 40.0 31.8 28.4 26.2
(0.0)∗∗ (2.9)∗∗ (3.6)∗∗ (4.3)∗∗
Competitor-brand repricing costs
Bass 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.0)∗∗ (0.0) (0.0) (7.9)∗∗
Becks 40.0 35.8 33.3 18.0
(0.0)∗∗ (10.0)∗∗ (7.3)∗∗ (8.7)∗∗
Corona 40.0 31.5 27.8 18.0
(0.0)∗∗ (8.0)∗∗ (8.9)∗∗ (7.6)∗∗
Heineken 40.0 31.0 25.6 7.5
(0.0)∗∗ (6.7)∗∗ (6.2)∗∗ (2.3)∗∗
All 40.0 30.6 25.7 18.0
(0.0)∗∗ (3.3)∗∗ (3.9)∗∗ (4.1)∗∗
Own-brand repricing costs
Bass 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.0)∗∗ (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Becks 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.0)∗∗ (0.0) (0.1) (0.0)
Corona 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.0)∗∗ (0.0) (0.1) (0.0)
Heineken 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.0)∗∗ (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
All 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.0)∗∗ (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Table 11: Counterfactual experiments: median pass-through of a 5-percent appreciation of the relevant
foreign currency. Median over 404 markets. Retailer’s incomplete pass-through: the retail price’s percent change for
the given percent change in the exchange rate, attributed to the presence of local dollar-denominated costs or to the
retailer’s markup adjustment. Manufacturer’s incomplete pass-through: the manufacturer price’s percent change for a
given percent change in the exchange rate, attributed to the share of local dollar-denominated costs in the manufacturer’s
total costs or to the manufacturer’s markup adjustment. Standard errors from bootstrap simulations with 400 draws
reported in parentheses under each coeﬃcient. Starred coeﬃcients signiﬁcant at the *10- or **5-percent level. Source:
Authors’ calculations.
45Manufacturer Retailer
Local Markup Costs of Local Markup Costs of Total
Costs Adjustment Repricing Costs Adjustment Repricing
Brand Other Own Other Own
Bass 60.0 9.6 30.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Beck’s 60.0 1.7 2.5 35.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Corona 60.0 8.1 0.4 31.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Heineken 60.0 2.9 6.1 31.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
All 60.0 8.2 1.2 30.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Table 12: Counterfactual experiments: Decomposition of the incomplete transmission of a 5-percent
appreciation of the relevant foreign currency to consumer prices. Median over 404 markets. Local costs:
the share of the incomplete transmission explained by the presence of a local dollar-denominated component in foreign
manufacturers’ or the retailer’s marginal costs. Markup adjustment: the share of the incomplete transmission explained
by the retailer or manufacturer’s markup adjustment excluding markup adjustment due to ﬁxed costs of price adjustment.
Repricing costs, other: The eﬀect of competitors’ costs of price adjustment on the manufacturer or retailer’s own price
adjustment behavior. Repricing costs own: Fixed costs of price adjustment incurred by the manufacturer or retailer to
change its own price. Source: Authors’ calculations.
46A Decomposing Pass-through Elasticities
In this appendix, we describe the expressions used to decompose the pass-through elasticities into the
part due to the presence of local costs and the part reﬂecting markup adjustment. The pass-through
elasticity of the exchange-rate shock to the wholesale price after accounting for the manufacturers’
nontraded costs is given by (ln(
 + 
 )ln
 ) and after accounting for manufacturers’ markup
adjustment is given by (ln
 ln
 ) The pass-through elasticity to the retail price after accounting
for the retailer’s non-traded costs is (ln(
 + 
)ln




The decomposition then computes the contributions of the manufacturers’ and retailer’s non-traded
costs and markup adjustment to the 1− (ln
ln
 ) part of the original shock not passed through
to the retail price. Given the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation used to model the manufacturers’ mar-
ginal costs in Section 4.1, the contribution of its non-traded costs to generating incomplete pass-
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 Similarly, the contribution of the retailer’s non-traded costs to the incom-
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To assess the contribution of repricing costs to the incomplete pass-through, we compare the pass-
through elasticities across Simulations 1 and 2 for the strategic eﬀect of the repricing costs, and then







is the same across all three simulations, we only need to calculate the diﬀer-
ence in the wholesale price pass-through across the three simulations to quantify the eﬀects of manufac-
turer repricing costs on the total incomplete pass-through. The contribution of other ﬁrms’ costs of price















ond subscript (1 or 2) denotes which simulation produced the variable. Finally, the contribution of ﬁrms’
















This appendix reports the results of a number of robustness checks to our baseline model. We discuss
results for variants of the model in which we lengthen the horizon over which ﬁrms and/or consumers
optimize their behavior, as well as alter the types of price changes used to compute the structural
model’s cost parameters. We ﬁnd that for each of these variants of our baseline model, the results for
the pass-through counterfactuals and the decomposition do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from our baseline
results.
Relaxing Assumption of Firm Myopia We report here results from a variant of our baseline
model that lengthens the horizon over which ﬁrms set prices and optimize proﬁts relative to the baseline
weekly model, while consumers continue to optimize their purchases on a weekly basis. The underlying
assumption in this setup is that ﬁrms have perfect foresight: They accurately predict the realized values
of all variables in the model in the near future, including their own and the competitors’ adjustment
costs. We report results for a model where ﬁrms optimize proﬁts over one month: We set their discount
factor equal to 1 because this is weekly data. The results, reported in Tables B.1 and B.2, do not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from our baseline results. We also ran versions of this model in which ﬁrms optimize proﬁts
over periods from two weeks to six weeks, ﬁnding no signiﬁcant diﬀerences from our baseline results in
any of these cases. These additional results are available on request from the authors.
The results from these additional robustness checks imply that our assumption of ﬁrm myopia is
reasonable in the sense that it does not impact the bottom line of our ﬁndings. Intuitively, this happens
because in most periods there is little change in the main variables aﬀecting proﬁts. The main variation
comes from exchange rates, which exhibit little variation from week to week - except for the few periods
when they abruptly change. Our model’s results thus appear reasonably close to the results from a ﬁnite
horizon dynamic model, which we in turn expect to approximate an inﬁnite horizon model fairly well.
Additional Robustness Checks We also ran a number of additional robustness checks whose
results are available on request from the authors. We ﬁrst ran a bi-weekly model, a monthly model,
a n das i x - w e e k l ym o d e li nw h i c hw ea l l o w e dboth ﬁrms and consumers to optimize over longer time
horizons. We found that the model’s demand parameters do not vary signiﬁcantly when we allow
consumers to optimize their purchases over a longer time horizon which supports our argument that
demand dynamics are not a ﬁrst-order concern in this market. We also found that the results from
the counterfactuals do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those of the baseline model, which, together with
our robustness checks reported above, is consistent with our argument that the use of static ﬁrst-order
conditions to approximate ﬁrms’ optimal pricing is a reasonable assumption in this market.
We also ran a series of robustness checks that vary the criteria for constructing the sample of price
changes, which in turn is used to compute the structural model’s cost parameters. The ﬁrst sample
48includes promotional price changes only (sales), the second, level price changes only, and the third,
all price changes including the post-promotion price changes we exclude in the baseline model, as we
discuss in Section 4.1. The results from the counterfactuals using bounds derived from each of these
samples do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those of the baseline model.
49traded markup adj traded markup adj
No repricing costs bass 40.0% 31.9% 27.4% 27.1%
becks 40.0% 40.0% 36.5% 32.5%
corona 40.0% 32.2% 29.5% 32.2%
heineken 40.0% 40.1% 35.4% 32.3%
all 40.0% 38.1% 33.9% 31.7%
Other repricing costs bass 40.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
becks 40.0% 39.8% 36.4% 32.4%
corona 40.0% 32.0% 29.4% 18.0%
heineken 40.0% 32.4% 28.2% 18.0%
all 40.0% 31.7% 28.4% 18.0%
Own repricing costs bass 40.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
becks 40.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
corona 40.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
heineken 40.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
all 40.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Table B.1 Counterfactual Experiments: Model Relaxes Myopia Assumption
Manufacturer Retailer
Counterfactual experiments: Median pass-through of a 5-percent depreciation of the relevant foreign 
currency. Median over 398 markets. Retailer's incomplete pass-through: the retail price's percent change 
for the given percent change in the exchange rate, attributed to the presence of local dollar-denomianted 
costs or to the retailer's markup adjustment. Manufacturer's incomplete pass-through: the manufacturer 
price's percent change for a given percent change in the exchange rate, attributed to the share of local 
dollar-denominated costs in the manufacturer's total costs or to the manufacturer's markup adjustment. 
Source: Authors' calculations.Total
local markup local markup
brand costs adjustment other own costs adjustment other own  
bass 60.0% 8.1% 31.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
becks 60.0% 0.0% 0.2% 39.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
corona 60.0% 7.8% 0.2% 32.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
heineken 60.0% 0.0% 7.8% 32.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.2%
all 60.0% 1.9% 6.4% 31.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Counterfactual experiments: Decomposition of the incomplete transmission of a 5-percent appreciation of the relevant 
foreign currency to consumer prices. Median over 398 markets. Local costs: The share of the incomplete transmission 
explained by the presence of a local dollar-denominated component in foreign manufacturers' or the retailer's marginal 
costs. Markup adjustment: the share of the incomplete transmission explained by the retailer or manufacturer's markup 
adjustment excluding markup adjustment due to fixed costs of price adjustment. Repricing costs, other: The effect of 
competitors' costs of price adjustment on the manufacturer or retailer's own price adjustment behavior. Repricing costs, 
own: Fixed costs of price adjustment incurred by the manufacturer or retailer to change its own price. Source: Authors' 
calculations.
Table B.2 Decomposition: Model Relaxes Myopia Assumption
Manufacturer Retailer
costs of repricing costs of repricingC Demand Estimation and Habit Formation
This appendix discusses one additional way dynamics may enter the demand estimation from intertem-
poral eﬀects stemming, for example, from habit formation. The implications of such dynamics are
explored in Froot and Klemperer (1989), Slade (1998) and in a recent theoretical paper by Ravn,
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010). While we believe that such dynamics are potentially important, it is
not feasible to incorporate them into our current approach in a way that would allow us to estimate
the model. In addition, the reduced-form evidence presented in Froot and Klemperer (1989) is not
conclusive regarding the importance of these dynamics in explaining incomplete exchange-rate pass-
through. To our knowledge, the only paper that has succeeded in estimating a model similar to ours,
but with dynamics on the demand side, is Slade (1998), which employs a linear demand speciﬁcation.
In comparison to Slade’s paper, our approach puts more emphasis on the modelling of the demand side
by allowing for a high degree of product diﬀerentiation and quite ﬂexible estimation of the curvature
of demand. We believe that the latter is particularly important in the context of the question we are
trying to address, as one of the explanations for incomplete pass-through is markup adjustment by ﬁrms
which is quite responsive to the estimated curvature of demand. The price we pay for this ﬂexibility,
however, is not to oﬀer an explicit treatment of dynamics. We note however that our demand framework
allows us to control for habit formation and the res u l t i n g“ b r a n dl o y a l t y ”i nar e d u c e d - f o r mw a y :A l l
our speciﬁcations include brand ﬁxed eﬀects, which capture, among other things, consumer loyalty for
a particular brand. One indication that this reduced-form treatment of dynamics may be a reasonable
shortcut is the fact that the markup estimates we obtain based on the demand system appear plausible
and consistent with industry wisdom.
52D Knittel-Metaxoglou Critique
In the estimation of highly nonlinear models such as random-coeﬃcients demand systems, the objective
function may exhibit many local minima. Knittel and Metaxoglou (2008) (hereafter, KM) ﬁnd that
in random-coeﬃcients demand systems convergence may occur at local minima, saddle points, and in
regions of the objective function where the ﬁrst-order conditions are not satisﬁed. To check that our
estimates are not stuck at a local minimum, we examine their sensitivity to: 1) the tolerance criterion
used to terminate the contraction mapping process that computes the mean utility; 2) diﬀerent starting
values for the nonlinear optimization; 3) the type of nonlinear search algorithm used. We also check that
the objective function’s ﬁrst- and second-order conditions for optimality are satisﬁed at our identiﬁed
optimum to ensure it has converged to a local minimum, not a saddle point. To verify that we have
identiﬁed the global minimum, we conﬁrm that our estimates are associated with the lowest value of
the objective function we observe with a zero gradient and a positive-deﬁnite Hessian. Finally, we make
sure that our estimates appear reasonable from an economic-theoretic standpoint.
1. Strictness of the tolerance criterion used to terminate the contraction mapping
process that computes the mean utility
In the contraction mapping process that computes the mean utility, we use a ﬁxed tolerance level of
1e−9 This tolerance level is much stricter than that used in some random-coeﬃcients demand models
in the literature. For example, Berry et al (1995) use a tolerance of 1e−4 to terminate their contrac-
tion mapping process. As illustrated by the results in section 6 of KM, the strictness of the criteria
used to terminate the contraction mapping process can help ensure that the GMM objective function
does not converge at a saddle point or other unacceptable point. We ﬁnd that the objective function
does not converge to the same set of estimates when we use a lower tolerance level to terminate the
contraction mapping (e.g., 1−4-1−6). This may indicate that the objective function is fairly ﬂat in
the neighborhood of the global optimum. (Note that the termination tolerance on the GMM objective
function value and the parameter estimates for all our estimates is ﬁxed at 0.01.) When we use a stricter
convergence tolerance for the contraction mapping, such as 1−12 the objective function converges to
the same set of estimates but only with a limited set of starting values, as there are other local minima
in the neighborhood of the global minima. We settle on a ﬁxed tolerance level of 1−9 for the estimates
reported in the paper as it appears robust to the use of diﬀerent starting values but also locates the
global minimum.
2. Starting values
We verify that a number of diﬀerent starting values converge to the region of our identiﬁed optimum
and we document the presence of other local minima as the starting value for each random coeﬃcient
varies from a large negative number to a large positive number. We check that for each of these local
minima the value of the GMM objective function is higher than at our identiﬁed global minimum.
533. Robust optimization algorithm
To ensure that our estimates are not overly sensitive to our starting values, we use a very robust
optimization algorithm, the Nelder-Mead non-derivative simplex search method, although it takes much
longer to converge than the gradient-based quasi-Newton search method. We ﬁnd our results are robust
to using the quasi-Newton search method provided the starting values are not too far from the global
optimum.
4. Veriﬁcation of ﬁrst- and second-order conditions for optimality
KM emphasize the importance of verifying ﬁrst- and second-order conditions for an identiﬁed op-
timum. Following KM’s recommendation, we conﬁrm that our identiﬁed optimum satisﬁes ﬁrst and
second-order conditions for optimality. (Recall that if the norm of the gradient is close to zero and the
Hessian is positive deﬁnite (its eigenvalues are all positive) at parameter estimates x, then the GMM ob-
jective function attains a local minimum at x. If the Hessian has both positive and negative eigenvalues
at parameter estimates x, then the GMM objective function attains a saddle point at x.)
The Nelder-Mead non-derivative simplex search method we use identiﬁes an optimum without keep-
ing track of the gradient or Hessian along the way. To compute ﬁrst- and second-order conditions for
optima identiﬁed via non-derivative search methods, KM calculate numerical gradients and Hessians
using the Matlab routines fminunc.m and eig.m. Although fminunc is an optimization routine, it pro-
vides gradients and Hessians as by-products. Like KM, we use fminunc to compute the norm of the
gradient and the eigenvalues of the Hessian for the optimum associated with our parameter estimates.
We ﬁnd the maximum of the absolute value of the gradient for our identiﬁed optimum is 55∗−10
which is quite close to zero and certainly below KM’s cut-oﬀ point of 30 to identify a critical point.
The Hessian’s eigenvalues are both positive indicating it is positive deﬁnite. They are 00441 ∗ −4
and 05530 ∗ −4Finally, to ensure that our identiﬁed optimum is the global minimum, we conﬁrm
that our estimates are associated with the lowest value of the objective function with a zero gradient
and a positive-deﬁnite Hessian. The value of the GMM objective function at the global optimum is
20771 ∗ −18
5. Reasonable results from an economic-theoretic standpoint
Finally, one way to be conﬁdent that a global optimum has been identiﬁed is to check that the
parameter values appear reasonable from an economic theoretic viewpoint. As we write in Section
4.1.1, “Table 4 reports results from estimation of the full random-coeﬃcients logit demand system. We
allow consumers’ income to interact with their taste coeﬃcients for price and percent alcohol. As we
estimate the demand system using product ﬁxed eﬀects, we recover the mean consumer-taste coeﬃcients
in a generalized-least-squares regression of the estimated product ﬁxed eﬀects on product characteristics
(bitterness and percentage alcohol). The coeﬃcients on the characteristics generally appear reasonable.
The random coeﬃcient on income, at 38.45, is signiﬁcant at the ﬁve-percent level, which implies that
higher-income consumers are less price sensitive. Consistent with industry lore, the mean preference in
54the population is amenable to a bitter taste in beer, which has a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. As
the percentage of alcohol rises across brands, the mean utility in the population also rises, an intuitive
result, though higher-income consumers’ utility falls, evident in the negative and signiﬁcant random
coeﬃcient of -50.36, and consistent with industry lore regarding the typical consumer of light beer.”
55E An Alternative Approach to Computing Price Adjustment Costs
A natural question is the relationship of our “revealed preference” approach to alternative approaches to
estimate adjustment costs. This appendix discusses whether and how alternative modeling approaches
might be applied to compute adjustment costs in our set-up, and reports results from one such model as
a robustness check to our baseline results. We ﬁnd, reassuringly, that the point estimates for the price
adjustment costs from this alternative model lie between the means of the upper and lower bounds from
our baseline results for both the retailer and the manufacturers. Moreover, if we use these alternative
estimates to calibrate the size of adjustment costs in our model, we ﬁnd it produces the same results in
the pass-through counterfactuals and decomposition as does our baseline model.
Adjustment costs (or switching costs as they are alternatively called) appear in several literatures
in Economics (e.g., in the estimation of entry models where ﬁxed costs of entry play the same role as
adjustment costs in our framework; in the international trade literature where ﬁrms need to incur a
ﬁxed cost to enter export markets; in the labor and public ﬁnance literature where adjustment costs
may prevent workers from adjusting their labor supply optimally to exogenous shocks, or from moving
across ﬁrms, sectors, or regions; and in the marketing literature where adjustment/switching costs may
induce consumers to stick with previously purchased products). The particular way these costs are
modeled depends on the questions the researchers try to address in each case; given the large number of
studies addressing diﬀerent topics, we do not attempt to provide an overview of this literature. However,
a general characteristic of several of these studies is that they model adjustment costs as an additive
linear term in an individual’s utility function or a ﬁrm’s (reduced form) proﬁt function. For example, in
the marketing literature, this term is interpreted as a loyalty parameter, whereby a consumer’s utility
is higher when she sticks with a previously purchased product. In the entry literature, this term is
interpreted as the ﬁxed costs of entry. In the trade literature, the term is interpreted as ﬁxed costs
of exporting (that are zero if the ﬁrm keeps selling for the domestic market only). In addition, the
speciﬁcations include an additive error term that represents factors aﬀecting the utility or proﬁts that
are observed by the decision maker, but not the econometrician. By making additional assumptions
about the distribution of this error term (e.g., the extreme value distribution), one can estimate the
parameters of the corresponding model and obtain estimates of the adjustment costs.
In our case, an analogous approach for a ﬁrm facing a binary decision whether or not to change its
price would produce a speciﬁcation consisting of a term representing the observable part of the proﬁt
function, an additive adjustment cost and an additive error term. Using single-product notation for our










 + = {} (1’)
where  is realized as alternative  (change) if  6= −1 and as alternative  (no change) if  = −1
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 is an adjustment cost parameter that is paid if and only if  6= −1 For a given product j,
the value of an alternative,  = {}, is hence decomposed into two parts: the ﬁrst, V known by
the researcher up to some parameters and the second, an unknown part  treated by the researcher as
random (and which may include measurement error in V). This speciﬁcation is similar to the one we
use in the paper, except for the presence of the error term. Estimating this speciﬁcation would enable
us to obtain point estimates, and not just upper and lower bounds, of the adjustment costs.
Note however, that there is an important diﬀerence between the speciﬁcation above and those
typically used in the adjustment cost literature. In the latter, the observable part of the proﬁt function,
the V is typically modelled in reduced form (for example in the entry literature, the V represents
reduced form proﬁts, which are a function of a market’s demographics). In contrast, in our framework,
the V is modelled structurally. This has two implications. The ﬁrst one is that in the structural
modeling of these proﬁts, we are explicit at each step of the analysis about the information structure
and the interpretation of the error terms in the analysis; against this background, adding the error
term in the end, seems arbitrary and hard to justify (in other words, it is not clear what it is that the
researcher does not observe about the proﬁts given that we have already made speciﬁc assumptions
about what is observed about demand and costs in the earlier part of the analysis). More importantly,
as the notation above makes clear, the structural modeling of the proﬁts implies that the variables
entering the ﬁrst part of the proﬁt function are themselves a function of the adjustment costs. In
order to estimate the parameters in the above speciﬁcation (i.e., the marginal cost and adjustment cost
parameters) we would need to fully solve the model to ﬁgure out what the prices and market shares
would be, had the ﬁrm’s price adjustment followed a diﬀerent scenario, and we need to do this for
all possible counterfactual scenarios (note that the counterfactual prices and shares in each case are
functions of all model parameters and adjustment costs, which however are not known at this stage).
The presence of strategic interactions among manufacturers makes this a particularly daunting task.
It is not clear how one would implement the estimation in this case, or if this would be even feasible.
Even if it were feasible, the computational cost would be considerable. Note that this problem does not
arise in studies of consumer choice where the observable part of the utility function does not depend
on strategic interactions and the market equilibrium, and where the value of counterfactual scenarios
( e . g . ,t h ec h o i c eo fa na l t e r a t i v ep r o d u c t )c a ne a s i l yb ec o m p u t e d—a tl e a s ta sl o n ga st h ec h o i c es e ti s
not exceedingly large.
The approach we currently adopt allows us to separate the marginal cost from the adjustment cost
estimation; we use standard estimation techniques to back out marginal costs using data from periods in
w h i c hp r i c e sa d j u s t( w i t h o u ta n yi n f o r m a t i o no na d j ustment costs), and then use data from all periods
in the sample to derive bounds on the adjustment costs. The advantage of this approach is that we do
not need to fully solve the model to obtain estimates of the marginal costs and bounds - by relying on
revealed preference, we exploit the idea that the observed scenario must be more proﬁtable for the ﬁrm
57than some alternative scenario, without having to specify the full set of these alternative scenarios. Of
course, the price we pay is that we can derive bounds only, and not point estimates.
To further explore the possibility of adapting the approach commonly used in the switching cost
literature to our problem, we conducted the following robustness check. As noted above, estimating
marginal and adjustment costs using the speciﬁcation discussed above is exceedingly hard, if at all
feasible. However, we can take the marginal cost estimates we obtained using the standard procedure,
use those to derive counterfactual prices and market shares for a subset of possible scenarios (as we
currently do in the paper), and then plug those counterfactual prices and market shares into speciﬁcation
(1’). Given the interpretation of our bounds as the additional amount of proﬁt available from changing
a given product’s price each period, this is equivalent to collecting the residuals from each of the
inequalities considered in the paper’s Section 3.1, both those associated with the upper and the lower
bounds, collating them by product across periods with and without price adjustment, and then using
the resulting dataset (with one observation for each product and market) to estimate a simple binary
choice model of whether or not a ﬁrm adjusts its price in each period.
Note if one adopts the conventions of the most commonly used model in this literature, the logit
model, and assumes that the unobserved component of net proﬁt is distributed i.i.d. extreme value for
each alternative,  and , then the parameter of interest, 
 would be identiﬁed by the diﬀerence in
proﬁts between the two options for each observation — what we’ll call relative proﬁts, the observed part
of which is the bound estimated for that observation,  ∗
 =  − , and the relative error term
∗
 =  −  which is distributed logistic.
As a robustness check, we estimate one such discrete choice model, a binary logit model, with results
that are similar to, and consistent with, our estimated upper and lower bounds on the adjustment costs,
for both the retailer and the manufacturers. To do so, we assume a single ﬁxed adjustment cost
parameter across all the products and time periods in our sample, to ensure suﬃcient observations to
identify such a highly nonlinear model. We also include brand ﬁxed eﬀects in the estimation, to control
for brand-speciﬁc pricing idiosyncrasies, although the results are robust to simply pooling the data as
well.
We ﬁnd that at the level of relative proﬁts at which the marginal eﬀects rise rapidly, a common
measure of this type of threshold eﬀect, an increase in the relative proﬁts as a share of revenue of
roughly 0.74 percent is associated with a price change by each manufacturer, as reported in Table
E.1. This coeﬃcient, which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level, lies between the mean
manufacturer lower and upper bounds as a share of revenue of 0.64 and 1.28 percent, respectively, as
reported in the paper’s Table 9. Similarly an increase in relative proﬁts as a share of revenue of roughly
1.33 percent is associated with a price change by the retailer. This coeﬃcient, which is also statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level, lies between the mean retailer lower and upper bounds as a share of
revenue of 0.84 and 3.16, respectively. Finally, when we use these estimates to calibrate the size of
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the decomposition that are nearly identical to those of our baseline model. Note that the table reports
results for the brands used in our counterfactuals, Bass, Becks, Corona,a n dHeineken,a st h e s ea r e
the relevant brands for the counterfactuals. The results are also robust to including the other foreign
brands in the sample.
Variable Retailer Manufacturer
Relative Proﬁt as a Share of Revenue 1.33 .74
(0.10)∗∗ (0.10)∗∗
Pseudo 2 0.08 0.11
Observations 1616 1616
Table E.1: Adjustment costs as a share of revenue from structural choice model. Coeﬃcients represent the
threshold level of relative proﬁts as a share of revenue required to rapidly increase the probability of a price change. The model
includes brand ﬁxed eﬀects. Includes observations for Bass, Becks, Corona, and Heineken. Source: Authors’ calculations.
Although this simple logit model produces results similar to our baseline model, it is diﬃcult to justify
the assumptions that underlie it, in particular the source and properties of the additive error term and
t h ef a c tt h a ti no r d e rt oi m p l e m e n tt h el o g i tw ec o n sider only a subset of all possible counterfactual
scenarios (which is not theoretically consistent). In our view, it would require a completely diﬀerent
set-up to use such a framework appropriately to derive ﬁrms’ adjustment costs.
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